Trump: “Are you listening, Israel?” Sound familiar?

I'm old enough to remember when it was considered tacky for a Presidential candidate to publicly call on a foreign country to help his political campaign.

Trump, 2016: "But it would be interesting to see – I will tell you this – Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 [Hillary Clinton] emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press. Let’s see if that happens. That’ll be next."¹

Trump, 2024: "It just came out Columbia cancelled their commencement. That shouldn't happen. It also came out that the protesters – many of the protesters – are backed by Biden's donors. Are you listening, Israel? I hope you're listening, Israel. Hope you're getting smart."²

I heard a presentation earlier this year by an Israeli economist, Arie Krampf³, talking about Netanyahu’s goal of reducing Israel’s dependence on the US under why Krampf calls the Netanyahu Doctrine:

Since the early 2000s, a new national economic-security doctrine was consolidated by center-right elements in the Israeli political system. Benjamin Netanyahu, first as minister of finance and then as prime minister, played a key role in shaping what I describe as the transition from the financial dependency doctrine of Ben-Gurion to a financial independence model, which allows for a more independent foreign policy.⁴ [my emphasis]

Krampf explains that economics for small countries like Israel is especially dependent on its foreign relations.

In his view, Netanyahu has been trying to reduce Israel’s dependence on the US as a way of reducing American pressure on Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians and any pressure that comes from demands of Western allies around protecting democracy and the rule of law. That means trying to improve relations with some of the nations like Russia and Saudi Arabia that operate more in the autocratic mode.

US foreign policy is not based primarily on the democracy-vs.-autocracy theme. But this is a part of the international-relations environment. And, as we see in the current military conflict in Gaza, protesters in the democratic world are creating real political pressure, especially in the US, over the lack of observation of international law. Although the Biden Administration’s invocation of “the rules-based international order” is not the same as democracy and the adherence to international law, that’s a distinction that voters don’t clearly make. US voters generally don’t like to see the carnage and starvation Israel is currently inflicting on the Palestinians in Gaza. To put it mildly.

Netanyahu has pushed hard as Prime Minister to drastically limit the independence of the judiciary, which is a key element of rule-of-law governance. There doesn’t seem to be much argument over the fact that he has been trying to push for a more authoritarian government in Israel itself. And aligning more closely with the Putins and Orbáns and Javier Mileis of the world in foreign policy would be a more comfortable positioning for his authoritarian project. On the other hand, to keep pursuing an aggressive policy of settlements and violent hostility on a dramatic scale, he knows Israel is dependent on the US foreign aid, military assistance, arms sales, and diplomatic support it now receives.

Krampf describes the process that led Netanyahu to think he had more room than previous governments to resist US pressure toward peace plans and a settlement of the Palestinian territorial issue.

By late 2003, Israel’s current account had become positive and was growing, indicating that foreign currency was pouring into the economy. This change, which went unnoticed by the Israeli public, was nothing less than a transformative moment, a revolution in Israel’s economic history. [The previously prevailing] doctrine assumed dependency on foreign capital. This dependency, I argue, was a key element in the national vision and identity: the dependence of the state-building project on foreign assistance. By becoming a “surplus country” for capital flows meant that more foreign currency was entering Israel than leaving it through nonfinancial transactions. Israel had become less vulnerable than it had been before.

The Bank of Israel hoarded part of the foreign currency. The Bank of Israel’s foreign reserves, having rocketed since 2007, currently are among the highest in the world per gross domestic product. At the same time, despite the deadlock in the peace process with the Palestinian Authority, Israel’s risk premium on government bonds stayed low and matched the risk premium of some countries in Europe.

From the perspective of foreign policy, the termination of the peace process and the strengthening of the economy led Israel to take a unilateral approach to the conflict. This approach included the withdrawal from Gaza in 2004.

What I call the Netanyahu doctrine is based on geographic, institutional, and even mental separation between Israel as a globalized economy and Israel as a state that occupies a territory and engages in a territorial conflict. Elsewhere I have called this doctrine “hawkish neoliberalism,” a doctrine based on the premise that free markets must be harnessed to serve the national purpose. [bolding in original; italics mine]

Biden’s recent threats about “red lines” appear in practice to be little more than PR posturing for the domestic US electorate. But the Democratic Party voters are now cautious-to-hostile to Netayahu’s government in Israel. I commented to Krampf in the question period, that it seems like the only way to achieve that goal of authoritarianism at home while maintaining full US support for the immediate future would be … Donald Trump. His comment in response was “Yes. It’s all up the Americans.”

So even if Netanyahu’s hostile statements about Biden and the kabuki quarrels over “red lines” weren’t already a strong clue, his longer-term strategy to take an even stronger course against US preferences while maintaining full US support makes favoring Trump a logical preference. Trump is a loose cannon. And he obviously knows and cares very little about foreign policy issues as such, unless we count his famous fondness for tariffs. (And he really seems to be aware of how tariffs work.)

But Trump can presumably be bribed, and not only with technically legal campaign contributions. And he also knows that Christian Zionist Protestant fundamentalists are the most loyal segments of his voting base and they are cheerleaders for any military actions against Palestinians or neighboring countries that a rightwing government in Israel might take.

Krampf’s 2022 assessment concludes this way:

The future of the Netanyahu doctrine also depends on the course of the Israel–US relationship because Israel remains significantly dependent on the US. Israel’s ability to forge independent relations with China and Russia has limits due to US concerns with technology transfer. It could be the case that after Russia’s war in Ukraine, a revitalized West led by the US will pressure Israel to realign its foreign policy, despite its increased financial independence.

1. Wolf, Z. Byron (2024): Trump asked Russians to get Clinton emails. They immediately started trying. CNN 07/14/2018. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/13/politics/trump-asked-russians-to-get-clinton-emails-they-immediately-started-trying-/index.html> (Accessed: 2024-15-05).

2. 'We'll Immediately Deport You' | Trump Ramps Up Campus Protests Over Israel-Palestine as Key Campaign Issue Against Biden. Haaretz 05/13/2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-05-13/ty-article/.premium/trump-ramps-up-campus-protests-over-israel-as-a-key-campaign-issue-against-biden/0000018f-71b4-d7ad-abdf-f5befa1a0000> (Accessed: 2024-15-05).

3. Lecture at Paris Lodron University Salzburg 03/21/2024.

4. Krampf, Arie (2024): The Netanyahu Doctrine. Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, Nov. 2022. <https://jstribune.com/krampf-the-netanyahu-doctrine/> (Accessed: 2024-15-05).