Two intriguing intelligence stories about Ukraine
Here are two recent intelligence stories that are intriguing but whose significance is a challenge to describe.
Julian E. Barnes et al, U.S. Believes Ukrainians Were Behind an Assassination in Russia New York Times 10/05/2022
James Risen and Ken Klippenstein, The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong? The Intercept 10/05/2022
The NYT cites US government sources telling them, "United States intelligence agencies believe parts of the Ukrainian government authorized the car bomb attack near Moscow in August that killed Daria Dugina, the daughter of a prominent Russian nationalist, an element of a covert campaign that U.S. officials fear could widen the conflict."
They cite "officials", "American officials", and "U.S: officials" as their sources, without further identification.
The story explains that US "intelligence agencies" believe that it was in fact Ukrainians who orchestrated the Dugina assassination, which the Russian had also claimed just after the event. The story does not say they agree with the specific story that Russia initially used, which always struck me as unlikely:
Russia’s domestic intelligence service, the F.S.B., blamed Ms. Dugina’s murder on Ukraine’s intelligence services. In an announcement made a day after the attack, the F.S.B. said that Ukrainian operatives had contracted a Ukrainian woman, who entered Russia in July and rented an apartment where Ms. Dugina lived. The woman then fled Russia after the bombing, according to the F.S.B.
On first reading, the NYT story sounds like some kind of authorized set of leaks rather than any kind of whistleblower source. And they seemed to want to publicize US worries about reckless actions by Ukrainian intelligence that the US does not approve. Or maybe that they want someone to think the US doesn't approve of them:
The United States took no part in the attack, either by providing intelligence or other assistance, officials said. American officials also said they were not aware of the operation ahead of time and would have opposed the killing had they been consulted. Afterward, American officials admonished Ukrainian officials over the assassination, they said. ...
While Russia has not retaliated in a specific way for the assassination, the United States is concerned that such attacks — while high in symbolic value — have little direct impact on the battlefield and could provoke Moscow to carry out its own strikes against senior Ukrainian officials. American officials have been frustrated with Ukraine’s lack of transparency about its military and covert plans, especially on Russian soil. [my emphasis]
There are several plausible reasons for the US government to be putting out this story: actual frustration with Ukraine, which is the reason the NYT's sources apparently stressed; a desire to shift blame from the US or some other government for the attack onto Ukraine; a desire to pump up the achievements and capabilities of Ukrainian intelligence operations; or, just generating confusion about the incident for whatever reason.
The NYT reports further:
Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s security services have demonstrated their ability to reach into Russia to conduct sabotage operations. The killing of Ms. Dugina, however, would be one of the boldest operations to date — showing Ukraine can get very close to prominent Russians. ...
While the Pentagon and spy agencies have shared sensitive battlefield intelligence with the Ukrainians, helping them zero in on Russian command posts, supply lines and other key targets, the Ukrainians have not always told American officials what they plan to do.
The United States has pressed Ukraine to share more about its war plans, with mixed success. Earlier in the war, U.S. officials acknowledged that they often knew more about Russian war plans — thanks to their intense collection efforts — than they did about Kyiv’s intentions.
Cooperation has since increased. During the summer, Ukraine shared its plans for its September military counteroffensive with the United States and Britain.
U.S. officials also lack a complete picture of the competing power centers within the Ukrainian government, including the military, the security services and Mr. Zelensky’s office. This may explain why some parts of the Ukrainian government may not have been aware of the plot. [my emphasis]
I don't have a favorite theory on who was really behind it. It sounds like the target could actually have been Dugina, a very pro-government TV broadcaster, or her father Alexander Dugin, a rightwing nationalist ideologue who has been identified as having at least at time been very close to Putin. But why would Ukraine want to assassinate either the ideologue or his daughter in the context of this year's war? What signal would that send, and to whom?
Risen and Klippenstein report on the CIA's evaluation of the relative strength of the Russian and Ukrainian armies when the war started:
U.S. intelligence reports at the time predicted that Kyiv would fall quickly, perhaps in a week or two at the most. The predictions spurred the Biden administration to secretly withdraw some key U.S. intelligence assets from Ukraine, including covert former special operations personnel on contract with the CIA, the current and former officials said. Their account was backed up by a Naval officer and a former Navy SEAL, who were aware of the movements and who also asked not to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
The CIA “got it completely wrong,” said one former senior U.S. intelligence official, who is knowledgeable about what the CIA was reporting when the Russian invasion began. “They thought Russia would win right away.” [my emphasis]
But despite that apparently defective evaluation of the situation, Risen and Klippenstein report that the US has ramped up not only the CIA's presence in Ukraine for intelligence gathering (understandable enough!) but also covert actions inside Ukraine:
There is a much larger presence of both CIA and U.S. special operations personnel and resources in Ukraine than there were at the time of the Russian invasion in February, several current and former intelligence officials told The Intercept.
Secret U.S. operations inside Ukraine are being conducted under a presidential covert action finding, current and former officials said. The finding indicates that the president has quietly notified certain congressional leaders about the administration’s decision to conduct a broad program of clandestine operations inside the country. [my emphasis]
This is why I wish we had a much more active, responsible, and visible oversight from Congress on such matters. As the ridiculous Benghazi investigations conducted the Republicans showed, some alleged oversight efforts can be irresponsible and frivolous at the same time.
But there does need to be Congressional oversight into how much of a direct role the US is playing in the war. I hope Congress is keeping some kind of close eye on what the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine is doing, for instance.
Risen and Klippenstein write that there has been:
... a more fundamental failure that officials have not fully acknowledged: U.S. intelligence did not recognize the significance of rampant corruption and incompetence in the Putin regime, particularly in both the Russian army and Moscow’s defense industries, the current and former intelligence officials said. U.S. intelligence missed the impact of corrupt insider dealing and deceit among Putin loyalists in Moscow’s defense establishment, which has left the Russian army a brittle and hollow shell.
One of their sources also argues that Putin made the kind of error that American leaders have become famous for making: "Additionally, Putin imposed an invasion plan on the Russian military that was impossible to achieve, one current U.S. official argued. 'You can’t really separate out the issue of Russian military competency from the fact that they were shackled to an impossible plan, which led to poor military preparation,' the official said.
I would note that the Intercept article quotes Ben Hodges, identifying him as having "commanded U.S. Army forces in Europe from 2014 until 2018." Hodges also works for Republic Consulting LLC, whose business includes defense lobbying. News organizations should disclose such consultant ties when citing retired generals as expert sources.