John Mearsheimer on the current prospects for Ukraine in the war

Prospects are for a long war of attrition, to the great disadvantage of Ukraine

There's no commentator on foreign policy with whose work I have such a love-hate relationship with as I do with the political scientist John Mearsheimer. Because what he has to say is often unwelcome to hear. But he's depressingly often right.

My news feed on X-formerly-known-as-Twitter is full of various Very Serious People doing their best pom-pom-waving cheerleading for Ukraine in the current war. This long read from Mearsheimer comes from a whole different direction, “Bound to Lose: Ukraine’s 2023 Counteroffensive.”¹ Short version: the foreseeable future is not looking good at all for Ukraine. (Like, seriously not.)

The Ukrainian counteroffensive, very much encouraged by Ukraine's Western allies, has failed, he writes: "It appears that most Western elites and most Ukrainians are resigned to the fact that there is no escaping a bloody war of attrition with Russia." And his conclusion is: "Now, it is hard to tell a story about Ukraine’s future that has a happy ending." The pom-pom wavers should take note: he’s note relying on some eccentric analysis from shaky sources, but on public statements by Western military analysts - including Ben Hodges, a retired general who works for a military lobbying firm, Republic Consulting² and who has been a very public booster of the Ukrainian cause.

In his article, Mearsheimer explains in some detail why he sees the current situation as being a war of attrition in which Ukraine is at a distinct disadvantage. Including some fascinating military-historical observations about a “blitzkrieg” strategy, which Ukraine was pursuing in 2023, i.e., an attempt at a rapid breakthrough of a fortified line of defense to devastate the enemy’s military position behind the line. He’s not just tossing observations up against the wall to see what might stick.

Mearsheimer expects lots of recriminations in the West over why the counteroffensive didn't work. He also expects that "many in the West will argue that the time is now ripe for diplomacy." But he doesn't see that producing an end to the war any time soon either.

As Margaret MacMillan writes:

It is possible that Ukraine and Russia, perhaps under pressure from China and the United States, might one day agree to talk about ending the war. Timing can be critical. In World War I, although various peace initiatives were floated—for example, by the pope and by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson—both sides continued to cling to the hope of military victory. Only in the summer of 1918, when the German high command recognized it was losing, did Germany ask for an armistice. But it is hard to imagine what such a settlement in Ukraine would look like, and as the fighting and losses on both sides mount and more reports of Russia’s atrocities come to light, the accumulated hatred and bitterness will pose enormous obstacles to any concessions from either side. [my emphasis]³

Just to be clear: there are all kinds of communications going on between the US and Russia. But in the context, agreeing “to talk about ending the war” refers to serious peace talks to which both sides are committed.

One key point Mearsheimer emphasizes that despite the blustery talk we often see and hear in commentaries on the war, Russia’s army is not the Taliban. And, it’s also worth remembering, after 20 years of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US and NATO decided it was time to give up and go away.

Much is made of the fact that the US and NATO more generally are committed to training the Ukrainians to engage in “combined arms operations,” which was supposed to go a long way toward preparing them for the counteroffensive. The fact is that the Western armies of 2023 had little experience in armored warfare – the Iraq war took place 20 years ago in 2003 and the Iraqi army quickly disintegrated. And they had no experience fighting a war that was a fair fight. As retired US General Ben Hodges, who had once commanded the US Army in Europe, noted, “I certainly was never involved in a fight as large, violent and disorienting as the battles underway in Ukraine.” Or as one Ukrainian battalion commander remarked about his American trainers: “They fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the enemy there is not like the Russians.” [my emphasis]

He’s using the concept of “fair fight” there in a more technical military sense, not as some kind of general metaphor. Instead he’s referring to a situation where the opposing armies are equally enough matched in the particular situation that they have a somewhat equal chance of prevailing.

While surprises can always happen, Mearsheimer stresses that the prospects for any kind of decisive breakthrough by Ukrainian forces this year are very low:

It is now widely recognized that the [2023 Ukrainian ] counteroffensive has failed and there is no serious prospect of Ukraine suddenly achieving success before either the fall rains or Ukrainian leaders shut it down. For example, The Kyiv Independent recently ran a story with the title: “Inching Forward in Bakhmut Counteroffensive, Ukraine’s Hardened Units Look Ahead to Long, Grim War.” Relatedly, The Washington Post published an article on 10 August that emphasized the dark mood in Ukraine: “Two months after Ukraine went on the attack, with little visible progress on the front and a relentless, bloody summer across the country, the narrative of unity and endless perseverance has begun to fray. The number of dead — untold thousands — increases daily. Millions are displaced and see no chance of returning home. In every corner of the country, civilians are exhausted from a spate of recent Russian attacks. … Ukrainians, much in need of good news, are simply not getting any.” [my emphasis]

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also stressed the major challenges ahead for Ukraine back in February. “The good news is that Russia has not yet shown it can become a fully effective opponent.” But, he continued, months before the experience of the so-far unsuccessful Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023:

Wars of attrition are also so costly that they sometimes end with little strategic warning. All too often, however, they turn into enduring struggles, and wars of attrition like the war Russia is now inflicting on Ukraine involve far more than military casualties. …

In short, it is reckless to plan on victory—or even claim it is highly probable—until victory is won. Some recent statements that exaggerate Ukraine’s military successes to the point of claiming that the current military aid process will allow Ukraine to defeat Russia are yet another case of when limited military victories are given far too much importance.⁴ [my emphasis]

Samuel Charap also cites data from CSIS on the length of wars:

A study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, using data from 1946 to 2021 compiled by Uppsala University, found that 26 percent of interstate wars end in less than a month and another 25 percent within a year. But the study also found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.” Even those that last fewer than ten years can be exceptionally destructive. The Iran-Iraq war, for example, lasted for nearly eight years, from 1980 to 1988, and resulted in almost half a million combat fatalities and roughly as many wounded. After all its sacriices, Ukraine deserves to avoid such a fate.⁵ [my emphasis]

We might take some glimmer of optimism in reflecting that the current war could be argued to have have been going on since 2014 since Russia seized Crimea and protracted fighting began in two areas of the Donbas region. low-level fighting continued until 2022 despite the negotiations under the Minsk Process. But there is still no sign of an immediate prospect to ending the current war with a reasonably stable peace arrangement.

If you're really into Happy Endings and cheerful predictions, by all means don’t read anything by John Mearsheimer. He makes the legendary Cassandra look like the life of the party! The article by Anthony Cordesman cited above is also not brimming with short-term optimism, to put it mildly.

This video from the Australian Institute of International Affairs also describes the current war of attrition, though seemingly with a more upbeat spin than Mearsheimer’s⁶:

1. Mearsheimer, John (2023): Bound to Lose. John’s Substack 09/02/2023. (Accessed; 2023-03-09).

2. Ben Hodges, LTG USA, ret. - Senior Advisor. Republic Consulting website. <https://www.republicconsulting.com/about-hodges.php> (Accessed: 2023-03-09).

3. MacMillan, Margaret (2023): How Wars Don’t End: Ukraine, Russia, and the Lessons of World War I. Foreign Affairs 102:4, 64.

4. Cordesman, Anthony (2023): How? (and Does?) the War in Ukraine End: The Need for a Grand Strategy. Center for Strategic and International Studies 02/24/2023. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-and-does-war-ukraine-end-need-grand-strategy> (Accessed: 2023-04-09).

5. Charap, Samuel (2923): An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine. Foreign Affairs 102:4, 28-29.

6. A Strategic Analysis of the Russo-Ukraine War: An Update Australian Institute of International Affairs YouTube channel 08/30/2023. (Accessed: 2023-03-09).