Political earthquake with Javier Milei in Argentina
And not the good kind of political earthquake
One of my Facebook friends suggested that the circumstances in Argentina that led to the election of Javier Milei as President on Sunday was the result largely of decades of Peronist populism.
Milei made a rightwing populist appeal. But his politics are hard right. He is an economist and a “paleolibertarian,” aka, an adherent of what we might call Crack-Pipe economics and an authoritarian who has contempt for democracy and the rule of law. Authoritarian politics in Argentina is also called gorilismo, which basically means hardcore and even violently rightwing.
Apparently he even hates the idea of Argentina having its own currency:
Far-right economist Javier Milei's victory in Argentina's presidential runoff on Sunday means the country could abandon the peso — a radical move that would run counter to the country's dedollarization drive. …
Milei's been hyping up his desire to dollarize Argentina's beleaguered economy. He argued the move would help tame runaway inflation that hit 143% in October after a slump in the peso that's wiped out 99% of its value against the US dollar this year. …
Prominent economist Steve Hanke — a champion of Milei's dollarization drive — posted on X after the results were announced that the candidate's proposal was "clearly a vote-getter."
Hanke, a professor at Johns Hopkins University [?!?], said in August that Argentina should "mothball" its central bank and adopt the greenback as its currency to tame inflation.1
This is so crackpot it’s hard to imagine. Milei also has said he wants to abolish Argentina’s central bank, which I guess he would basically have to do if he’s just going to use the US dollar as the currency.
The Argentine edition of the democratic-socialist journal Jacobin writes:
Argentina is experiencing days of extreme political tension. There is no workplace, family or group of friends where there is no debate and worry. Anguish and anxiety are felt in the street atmosphere. Meanwhile, the Marxist left is in the midst of a controversy that conceals its own "crisis of representation": the left-wing constituency is in shock because most of the Trotskyist parties, grouped in the Left Front – Unity (FITU), decided to be neutral in the second round that could bring the far right to the head of the state institutions.2
The political division in Argentina is generally between the Peronist movement (democratic, often populist, and usually left-leaning) and the conservative bloc, which is more-or-less oligarchic and not has not always been excessively fond of democracy. There are various left splinter groups. The labels can be confusing. The main conservative party has long been the Radical Civic Union, which hasn’t bee left or particularly democratic for at least a century. There is a Socialist Party, which usually unites with the Radicals in national elections against the Peronists. (To add to the confusion, at election times the parties tend to form coalitions with different names.)
When it comes to left and center-left politics in Argentina, the Peronistas are where the action is.
Ordinary people, on the other hand, seem to have a good understanding of what is at stake. And they sprang into action to try to avert catastrophe. Already in the first round of October 22 we saw a defensive reaction of the working class, which expressed itself in the recovery of Peronism and the stagnation of Milei. Then, a militant reaction from civil society was set in motion: people getting on public transport to explain the danger posed by Milei, handwritten posters taped to the walls, makeshift tables in the streets, small rallies and demonstrations in different neighborhoods.3
Peronist populism over the decades
The relationship between Milei-style rightwing populism and Peronist left-populism makes an interesting comparison. But Milei's declared policies look for the moment to be a whole lot more like those of the military dictatorship of 1976-83. (If not worse!)
I would differentiate the phases of Peronism follows. American opinion in the 1940s tended to see Perón as more-or-less a fascist, largely because Argentina stalled on joining the Allied side. Ironically, in the wartime junta, Perón himself was an advocate *for* joining the Allies.
And the US Ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden was relentlessly opposed to Perón, not least because he was very involved in mining and finance businesses and in 1948 became a lobbyist for United Fruit Company. Perón's 1946 campaign slogan, "Braden o Perón" was an interesting twist on populism. Perón was a classic populist who did use the political construct of The Elite vs. The People. Making Braden a key symbol added a patriotic element to his appeal. Braden later became a director of the far-right, conspiracy-theory-oriented John Birch Society.
Perón in his first government wasn't exactly a "flawless democrat" (to borrow Gerhard Schröder's notorious phrase that he applied to Vladimir Putin). But he did restore democratic governance with competitive elections. His government also extended the vote to women for the first time in Argentina's history, a huge achievement. And he definitely promoted the labor movement and both public and private social projects (though the accounting practices of the latter weren't always flawless, either.)
But once he was overthrown by the 1955 coup, his party remained the most popular even though it was banned. The dynamics of Argentine politics was dominated by the fact that even the elected governments lacked democratic legitimacy because the most popular party was banned. When he came back to power in 1973 and served less than a year before his death, his policies took more of what we now call a neoliberal turn. And Isabel Perón's Presidency was effectively dominated by the noxious José López Rega, who turned out to be arguably Juan Perón's worst political mistake. López Rega was neither left nor populist. He was just a thug.
After the military dictatorship, Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union became President, followed by Peronist Carlos Menem, who pursued neoliberal economic policies, including the disastrous decision to peg the Argentine peso to the US dollar, a boneheaded idea which contributed heavily to the political crisis of 2001. (Milei favors doing something even worse, abolishing the Argentine currency altogether and just using the US dollar. See above.) With the Kirchners in power from 2003-2015, there was definitely a left-Peronist government, and I would see their politics as populist. Like the rest of the "pink tide" governments in Latin America, they were helped a lot by high commodity prices.
One of their biggest accomplishments was reducing the huge public debt burden with a deal in which bondholders took a big haircut. But the US Supreme Court in 2014 blew away about six centuries of precedent and decided for the vulture fund controlled by Paul Singer - now also known as Samuel Alito's sugar-daddy "personal friend" - saying Argentina had to pay off the defaulted debt in full, which forced Argentina back into a heavy debt burden. [Edited to correctSinger’s name]
Maricio Macri never pretended to be much of anything but the hereditary oligarch that he is. Alberto Fernández definitely operated in the Peronist tradition, but his accomplishments were limited. He was a Peronist but not exactly a kirchnerista, and the Peronist candidate Sergio Massa who lost to Milei this past Sunday is basically a conservative even though he ran as a Peronist. I didn't follow his recent campaign closely enough to really say how populist it was. But his pitch seemed to be more a "popular front" strategy against Milei rather than The Elite vs. The People.
I would say the left-Peronist governments were mainly 1945-1955, maybe 1973-74, 2003-2015, and 2019-2023. Peronism is still very much an active and influential political movement. Perón said that parties only matter when there are elections, and the rest of the time the movement is what's important. But Argentina's economic and political problems have more sources than Peronist deficiencies.
In a separate analysis, Mosquera argues that the current moment reflects a serious weakening of Peronism at the moment:
[O]n August 13 [first round of the Presidential vote], Peronism went to the polls completely unified and saw its vote share reduced to 27 percent. Now, for the first time, Peronism is on the verge of losing its majority in the Senate and is ceding control of governorships in provinces historically considered Peronist strongholds (Santa Cruz, San Juan, and Chaco are notable examples).
Since the restoration of democratic rule, Argentina has been rocked by several major capitalist crises (in 1989, 2001, and 2019). Each time, Peronism emerged as the “party of order,” the one force capable of providing the social ballast to keep the state from collapsing and restore governability. In that same sense, the current crisis of Peronism is very much a crisis of the Argentine state itself.
However, the tremors of the current political earthquake have been felt beyond the Peronist camp. Amid massive discontent with the incumbent Peronist government, the traditional right wing had until recently considered itself the heir apparent to the Casa Rosada. Now, with the appearance of Milei, the conservative coalition Juntos for el Cambio (Together for Change) is staring down thepossibility of its own collapse.4 [my emphasis]
This is likely to be a wild ride, however long Milei serves as President.
Tan, Huileng (2023): Argentina's new president Javier Milei thinks adopting the US dollar can rescue its screwed economy. Business Insider 11/20/2023. <https://www.businessinsider.com/argentina-president-election-peso-us-dollar-javier-milei-dedollarization-2023-11> (Accessed: 2023-20-11).
Mosquera, Martín (2023): ¿Es Milei una amenaza fascista? Jacobin (Argentina) 17.11.2023. <https://jacobinlat.com/2023/11/17/es-milei-una-amenaza-fascista/> (Accessed: 2023-20-11). My translation from Spanish.
Ibid.
Mosquera, Martín (2023): Argentina’s Crossroads Election Reminds Us to Never Underestimate the Far Right. Jacobin 11/19/2023. <https://jacobin.com/2023/11/argentina-election-far-right-peronism-javier-milei-inflation-crisis> (Accessed: 2023-20-11).