Politics of war and negotiations (or lack thereof) at the end of the first year of the Russia-Ukraine War

Here are two videos that give an example of the range of understanding of the Russia-Ukraine War in the West. Although they present different kinds of important perspective, both are worth hearing for substance as well as perspective.

For a notably hawkish spin, here is one featuring Butcher’s Bill Kristol interviewing Anne Applebaum on the war.

Applebaum is a respected scholar who actually knows something about Ukraine, among other reasons because she did a respected book called Red Famine on the mass hunger event, also called the Holodomor, that hit Ukraine particularly hard during the Soviet-era farm collectivization.

She is married to Radosław "Radek" Sikorski¹, a former Polish Foreign Minister and Former Polish Defense Minister who also served as Speaker of the lower house of the Polish Parliament. She writes for The Atlantic, which has generally taken a fairly stridently hawkish line on the current war, as has she, and has also done some serious analysis on the problem of liberal democracies deteriorating in authoritarian regimes. The latter is a very current concern in both Poland and the US. And in this video, she makes some distinct criticism of the current illiberal ruling party in Poland and its foreign policy. (And also some helpful observations on Polish-German relations.)

Kristol also comes from a notable political family. His father Irving Kristol² was a leading figure in developing the current trend of American neoconservatism. Irving followed in the family tradition, serving as editor of The Weekly Standard from 1995-2018, which was regarded as the flagship publication of neoconservatism. A co-founder of the imperialist-minded Project for a New American Century (PNAC), we was a huge supporter of the invasion of Iraq under the Cheney-Bush Administration.

His more recent adoption of a NeverTrump position has improved his image among Democrats, but hasn’t manifested itself in any drastic change of foreign policy orientation.

True to the neoconservatives’ idolatry of Winston Churchill, Kristol in the video³ invokes 1940 and the Battle of Britain with (of course) Ukraine and its President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the roles of Britain and Churchill.

Basically, Applebaum says just after 20:00 that the war needs to go on until there is something like a regime change in Russia, though she hedges at bit by calling it “to continue to fight until there is some kind of change in Russia, and I’m not going to tell your what that is.” The two examples she gives to illustrate that hope is France giving up on holding Algeria as a colony and Britain in Ireland. (England controlled Ireland from the 12th century to the 20th, and still controls a chunk of it.) It would be reasonable to conclude from this presentation that she sees weakening Russia if not regime change as the most desirable goal in the war and dismisses the idea that any kind of territorial concession on Ukraine’s part should be considered.

Taking such a position has a couple of advantages, especially if you’re main priority to promote open-ended fear of Russian military aggression. It lets you duck sticky but very practical questions like whether an immediate Ukrainian retaking of Crimea is feasible without crippling costs to Ukraine. And when it comes to whether Putin might be willing to use tactical nukes to prevent the loss of Ukraine⁴, well, the standard neocon position was expressed by George W. Bush on the prospect of armed guerilla fighting in Iraq: “Brang 'em on!”⁵ In that world, only wimps worry about things like nuclear war. Their basic polemic response to such a consideration is pretty much, “You’re a wuss for mentioning it.”

That also leaves the neocon chronic hawks in the position to denounce any outcome short of total military victory by Ukraine and regime change in Moscow as a cowardly sellout by Western weaklings, another “Yalta” as they like to call it.

A reality-based pragmatic view

A less dead-ender view was discussed by Ryan Grim on The Majority Report⁶ for February 17, starting after 22:00:

The scenario he discusses here has to do with how much territory Ukraine can retake in the next few months, how willing the US and NATO will be support a particularly tough fight for Crimea, and concern about how politically difficult it is likely to be seen as having lost Crimea. There is also a prosaic political calendar to consider. By the last quarter of 2023, the 2024 Presidential race will be well underway.

If Putin and the Russian leadership think there is a reasonable chance that Biden could be unseated by a less competent and/or more pro-Russian Republican, that would be incentive for them to prolong the war. So the Biden Administration in particular might prefer to see a peace settlement that doesn’t concede any permanent Ukrainian border changes but accepts some form of “frozen conflict” to be further renegotiated over time, i.e., a new and (hopefully) improved version of the Minsk process⁷.

On the other hand, there are concerns that Ryan Grim also discusses that Western defense industries may not be in the position to rush such large shipments of arms to Ukraine to drastically effect the military outcome in the next few months.⁸ When it comes to advanced weaponry, there is also a practical problem of training, which can take months.

And how high the priority of damaging Russia is for US policy is a heavy consideration. When looking at the risks presented by Putin expecting a more accommodating President coming to office, that would argue for the US to push for a shorter war and a peace settlement in 2023 or early 2024. But if the expected benefits of damaging Russia militarily and economically are weighed more heavily, then dragging out the war for years would serve the US better.

There’s also the very real consideration of how prolonged war with Russia over Ukraine affects the US policy that holds containing China to be the country’s most important priority. In almost any calculation based on conventional geopolitics, having Russia being cornered into maximizing good relations with China - as the current situation does - isn’t the ideal configuration for the official US anti-China policy.

Is it a sin to say the word “negotiation”?

For Ukraine and Europe, a end to the war sooner rather than later would be beneficial, depending of course on the terms of a peace settlement.

Peace advocates in the West can call for negotiations, as Jürgen Habermas recently did.⁹ As long as such appeals don't spread frivolous claims, it's hard to see the harm in people from civil society making them. Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Claus Leggewie, the latter one of the 20 co-publishers of the Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik (along with Habermas himself), responded by basically saying, yeah, well, what are you going to negotiate about, huh? (Maybe on how to end the war? Duh!)

Actually, Cohn-Bendit and Leggewie seem to have a more elaborate fantasy about regime change in Russia than Anne Applebaum. They basically argue that Russia is a complete basket case and will remain an incorrigible menace to everything good in the world for any foreseeable future. Their preconditions for negotiating with Russia about anything sound like downright Dr. Strangelove territory:

What Habermas ignores, the solidarity movement with Ukraine also mostly ignores: Putin will be gone [someday], but Russia will remain Kiev's neighbor. So you have to negotiate above all with the Russian opposition.

Any regime after Putin will be judged by the extent to which it acknowledges Russia's war guilt and hands Putin and his camarilla over to a tribunal.

Regime change is not limited to replacing Putin and installing a congenial autocrat. The democratization of Russia must not be limited (as in 1991ff.) to the holding of regular elections without normative and institutional foundations. The dissolution of the deep state includes the division of powers, an independent judiciary, a free press and the guarantee of civil liberties. [my translation]

They go on to say that Russia is “even less prepared” to do all that “than the German Reich was in the year 1945.” Apparently they think it would be immoral and irresponsible to try to negotiate with Russia about anything for the next 50 years or so. Yeah, that’s pretty much Dr. Strangelove thinking there! Maybe the editors persuaded them to add some less gloomy perspective, because they close by saying that, well, maybe one day Russia and Ukraine can cooperate, an idea they describe as “utopian.”

In a more sober mode, a leading German political scientist, Herfried Münkler, calls our attention to the fact that “negotiations are no alternative to fighting.”¹⁰ (Except, you know, when they are.) He points to the fact that opposing sides, in this case Russia and Ukraine, have little incentive to negotiate a peace deal if they see good prospects of winning, or if they think settling for less than total victory would be catastrophically bad for them.

In fact, there have been negotiations between Russia and Ukraine during the war, as Münkler explicitly acknowledges. They’ve negotiated over prisoner exchanges. And, very significantly, they negotiated mutually beneficial agreements allowing Ukrainian grain exports to continue without their ships being sunk or captured. This has made a huge difference for the countries that depend heavily on those exports. Ukraine has the nickname of “breadbasket of the world” for a reason.

I hope and assume that diplomats are at work behind the scenes exploring options and preparing for formal peace negotiations at some point. So I don’t really see the point of scolding people who say, hey, how about starting real negotiations to end the war? Unless you’re building a professional reputation as an anti-Russia hawk like Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland¹¹ or like-minded fellow-travelers.

Otherwise, politicians may get the idea that their constituents have no objection to an open-ended war with a serious risk of nuclear escalation.

On the other hand, what professional dirtbags like Trumpista US Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene have to say about the war is as disgusting as what they have to say about everything else.

Two real existing diplomatic gestures

Joe Biden made a personal appearance in Kyiv with Ukrainian President Zalenskyy on February 20. This Democracy Now! video¹² speculates on what this may actually signal.

The general spin I’ve seen in media articles - and presumably the one favored by the White House - is that this signals the uncompromising support of the US for Ukraine. But whether it’s also being prsented behind the diplomatic scenes as a statement to Russia that NATO won’t write Ukraine off so this might be a good time to talk about certain possibilities we’re willing to discuss if you’re willing to do X and Y remains to be seen. (Since Russia uses Z as a symbol of their cause in Ukraine, presumably Biden won’t be offereing a “Z” option.)

Matt Duss from the Carnegie Endowment does a decent job there of realistically framing the current prospects for meaningful negotiations.

The case that Medea Benjamin makes here isn’t particularly persuasive. But when it comes to vague calls for negotiations, the same considerations noted above still apply. Admittedly, at the moment, “stop sending weapons to Ukraine” is about the only more concrete demand that peace advocates can make. Although for the MTG’s and Tucker Carlsons of the world the ideal solution might be to back Russia in whatever it wants to do in Ukraine, real negotiations are not going to proceed from that assumption. At least not absent a complete collapse of Ukrainian military resistance.

The other major piece of public diplomacy in the news at the moment is that Wang Wi, “China's highest ranked diplomat”¹³ who previously served as Foreign Minister, is visiting to Russia, claiming to have some kind of peace initiative for the Russia-Ukraine War.¹⁴

China's top diplomat Wang Yi, who is to visit Russia this week on the one-year anniversary of its invasion of Ukraine, called on Monday for negotiations and peace for the sake of the world and Europe in particular.

"We would like a political solution to provide a peaceful and sustainable framework to Europe," Wang said ahead of a visit to Moscow during a stop in Hungary, which could result in billions of euros of new Chinese investment in the country.

China regards Russia as an ally, counter-balancing U.S. global power, and has so far refrained from condemning the Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine while repeatedly urging peace.

Bottom line: no peace in sight yet in the Russia-Ukraine War.

1. Radosław Sikorski. Wikipedia 02/09/2023. <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Rados%C5%82aw_Sikorski&oldid=1138378744> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

2. Irving Kristol. Wikipedia 01/19/2023. <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Irving_Kristol&oldid=1134646621> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

3. Anne Applebaum on Ukraine: One Year into the War. Conversations with Bill Kristol YouTube channel 02/16/2023. (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

4. “The [Crimean] peninsula, annexed illegally by Russia in 2014, represents Putin’s most important geopolitical accomplishment. Its loss would not be an acceptable option for him, let alone a bargaining chip to use in negotiating the terms of ending the war.” Rumer, Eugen (2023): Putin’s War Against Ukraine: The End of The Beginning. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 02/17/2023. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

5. McElvaine, Robert (2008): "Bring 'Em On!" - The Fifth Anniversary of Bush's Declaration of Indecency. HuffPost 07/10/2008/Updated 12/06/2017. <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bring-em-on-the-fifth-a_b_110233> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

6. Derailment Fallout, GOP Soc Security Surrender, Ukraine Endgame. The Majority Report 02/17/2023. (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

7. Allan, Duncan (2020): The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine. Chatham House 05/22/2020. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

8. Report: Ukraine war ups arms sales but challenges lie ahead. AP News 12/05/2022. <https://apnews.com/article/europe-business-united-states-global-trade-stockholm-614c607fd8b25ab609cfdfdea617705c> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

9. Cohn-Bendit, Daniel & Leggewie, Claus (2023): Habermas unterschlägt die Risiken 19. 02. 2023. <https://taz.de/Debatte-um-Verhandlungen-im-Ukrainekrieg/!5913766/> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

10. Münkler, Herfried (2023): Politikwissenschaftler Münkler: „Verhandlungen sind keine Alternative zum Kämpfen“. Deutschlandfunk Kultur 15.02.2023. <https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/habermas-plaedoyer-fuer-verhandlungen-keine-idee-wie-man-putin-dazu-bringt-dlf-kultur-06eeaf76-100.html> (Accessed: 2023-20-02).

11. Sterling, Rick (2021): Why Victoria Nuland Is Dangerous and Should Not Be Confirmed. LA Progressive 02/12/2021. <https://www.laprogressive.com/foreign-policy/victoria-nuland-is-dangerous> (Accessed: 2023-20-02). (Some of Sterling’s observations on Ukraine 2014 in this article deserve closer scrutiny.)

12. Biden in Ukraine: Matt Duss, Medea Benjamin Debate U.S. Involvement, Hopes for Peace. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 02/20/2023. (Accessed: 2023-21-02).

13. Wang Yi (politician). Wikipedia 02/20/2023. <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wang_Yi_(politician)&oldid=1140595592> (Accessed: 2023-21-02).

14. China's top diplomat urges end to hostilities ahead of Moscow visit. Reuters 02/20/2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-top-diplomat-urges-end-hostilities-ahead-moscow-visit-2023-02-20/> (Accessed: 2023-21-02).