Stephen Walt looks at the risks of the West's triumphalist rhetoric in the Russia-Ukraine War
Über-Realist Stephen Walt attended the Munich Security Conference this year. He’s not favorably impressed be the Dr. Strangelove strain of chronic (New?) Cold War triumphalism:
Diehard Atlanticists tend to portray the war in Ukraine as the single most important geopolitical issue in the world today. U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris said the war had “far-reaching global ramifications,” and the head of one U.S.-based think tank called it “the fulcrum of the 21st century.” Similarly, when asked how the war might end, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock replied that anything less than a complete Russian defeat and withdrawal would mean“the end of the international order and the end of international law.”
In this narrative, in short, what is at stake in Ukraine is the future of the entire rules-based order—and even the future of freedom itself. Some American and European speakers seemed to be competing to see who could give the most Churchillian speech, insisting that there was no substitute for victory, dismissing any risk of escalation, and calling for Ukraine’s supporters to give Kyiv whatever it needs to win a quick and decisive victory.1 [my emphasis]
But as he describes, the countries of the Global South are not inclined to adopt the Manichean, New-Cold-War view of the conflict, especially not the part where the NATO countries claim to be championing Freedom and the sanctity of international borders:
[P]eople outside the West view the rules-based order and Western insistence that states not violate international law as rank hypocrisy, and they were particularly resentful of Western attempts to claim the moral high ground on this issue. In their view, not only do Western powers make most of the rules, but they are also perfectly willing to violate these rules whenever it suits them. Not surprisingly, representatives from the global south were quick to bring up the United States’ illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003—where was the rules-based order then?
Opponents of the Iraq War were explicit about calling invasion of Iraq by the Cheney-Bush Administration in 2003 - we’re at the 20-year anniversary - was illegal and would undermine other powers’ inclination to not launch criminal wars. But during the “unipolar moment” of 1989-2022, when the US was by far the predominant power in the world with no “peer competitors” for that role, US Administration of both parties saw it as a good opportunity to throw the country’s weight around without worrying all that much about international law, instead pursuing the American version of a “rules-based order.” Which in practice too often means, we (America) give the orders and you other countries follow them.
As Walt points out, the countries of the Global South have their own very practical reasons for not seeing the Good vs. Evil choice that the US and NATO nations would prefer them to see:
[K]ey states in the global south do not share the Western belief that the future of the 21st century is going to be determined by the outcome of the war. For them, economic development, climate change, migration, civil conflicts, terrorism, the rising power of India and China, and many others will all exert a greater impact on humanity’s future than the fate of the Donbas or Crimea. They wonder why Western governments quickly found tens of billions of dollars to send Ukraine but wouldn’t pay enough to mount an effective global vaccination campaign against COVID-19. They ask why Ukraine is now in the spotlight 24/7, but the West devotes only intermittent attention to the lives being lost in sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, or other trouble spots. They are angry watching European states welcome Ukrainian refugees with open arms, given their prior hostility to refugees fleeing equally horrific situations in Syria or Afghanistan. And because the war is affecting their interests adversely (e.g., through higher food prices), they are more interested in ending it than helping Kyiv achieve all its war aims. [my emphasis]
But he also says that he found a pragmatic streak in private conversations with Security Conference participants that is more sober than the triumphalist public rhetoric: “None of my private meetings included officials at the very top of key governments, but nobody I spoke with expected the war to end soon and no one thought Ukraine would be able to retake all of its lost territory (including Crimea) no matter how much aid it gets in the next year.”
But as he precedes to point out, there are conventions in the public statements countries make during wartime that are not the same as their practical evaluations of real prospects. We could call that the I.F. Stone Principle: “All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out.”2
And he calls attention to the very practical electoral considerations that the Biden-Harris Administration is facing, which could be exacerbated if there’s not some kind of end to the fighting in sight:
If the war is still at a brutal stalemate in February 2024 and Ukraine is being destroyed, then Biden will face pressure eitherto do more or look for a plan B. Given what he’s promised, anything less than complete victory will look like failure. Moreover, if China decides to give Russia more help, then Biden might have to impose additional sanctions on the world’s second-largest economy, triggering new supply chain problems and jeopardizing the delicate economic recovery that is now underway. And if that happens, Republican presidential hopefuls (one of them in particular) will be licking their chops and liking their chances.
In other words, let’s hope that Biden and his top officials aren’t smoking their own rhetorical hashish!
Walt, Stephen (2023): The Conversation About Ukraine Is Cracking Apart. Foreign Policy 02/28/2023. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/28/the-conversation-about-ukraine-is-cracking-apart/> (Accessed: 2023-09-03).
Stone, I.F. (1967): In a Time of Torment, 1961-1967 (1967), 317. Quoted in: I. F. Stone. Wikipedia 03/06/2022 <https://en.wikiquote.org/w/index.php?title=I._F._Stone&oldid=3083163> (Accessed: 2023-09-03).