John Mearsheimer may be enjoying the most popular phase of his career. He's been right about a lot lately. But there's a determinism to his realist position that makes me uncomfortable: Namely the idea that all states will always try to become more powerful, in relation to their peer adversaries. But I think there are plenty of historical examples to counter the thesis, where states opt for the status quo or capitulation. Mearsheimer concedes that his realist paradigm has its limitations even as he continues to push it. This leads to advocating for, say, limited escalation against Iran (because that's just what states do) even though he understands the tap root is Israel/Gaza. So he's pushing for something that he knows won't work but it serves the theory. None of this leaves much room for diplomacy. Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think John M has much to say about that.
In practice, the "realist" foreign policy view can be hard to distinguish from "cynicism." A realist analysis can often be used to facilitate and justify actions taken on a might-makes-right basis. Stephen Walt has a very similar brand of realism to Mearsheimer's, although Walt puts more emphasis on international law as a practical set of structures. When pressed, Mearsheimer will talk about what is he regards as moral and not in foreign policy choices. But their "realist" framework doesn’t fit well with notions of international political solidarity like those of the First, Second, and Third Internationals, or Islamist unity, or the Cold War Triumphalist ideas about liberal democratic states being natural allies.
The book Mearsheimer and Walt did on "The Israel Lobby" is a good example of their approach. In that case, they argued that the Israel policy of the US had been driven by public sentiment, historical experiences, and the continuing effect of lobby groups. They argued that the US was making bad practical decisions on Israel from a "realist" view. Because Israel was in practical terms more of a burden than an asset to US foreign policy, and US support also encouraged Israel to take risks that were dangerous to its own medium- and long-term interests. Mearsheimer and Walt tend to offer policy advice of the "don't do stupid stuff" brand, the principle Obama supposedly held but he departed from it pretty drastically in practice in cases like Syria and Libya.
John Mearsheimer may be enjoying the most popular phase of his career. He's been right about a lot lately. But there's a determinism to his realist position that makes me uncomfortable: Namely the idea that all states will always try to become more powerful, in relation to their peer adversaries. But I think there are plenty of historical examples to counter the thesis, where states opt for the status quo or capitulation. Mearsheimer concedes that his realist paradigm has its limitations even as he continues to push it. This leads to advocating for, say, limited escalation against Iran (because that's just what states do) even though he understands the tap root is Israel/Gaza. So he's pushing for something that he knows won't work but it serves the theory. None of this leaves much room for diplomacy. Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think John M has much to say about that.
In practice, the "realist" foreign policy view can be hard to distinguish from "cynicism." A realist analysis can often be used to facilitate and justify actions taken on a might-makes-right basis. Stephen Walt has a very similar brand of realism to Mearsheimer's, although Walt puts more emphasis on international law as a practical set of structures. When pressed, Mearsheimer will talk about what is he regards as moral and not in foreign policy choices. But their "realist" framework doesn’t fit well with notions of international political solidarity like those of the First, Second, and Third Internationals, or Islamist unity, or the Cold War Triumphalist ideas about liberal democratic states being natural allies.
The book Mearsheimer and Walt did on "The Israel Lobby" is a good example of their approach. In that case, they argued that the Israel policy of the US had been driven by public sentiment, historical experiences, and the continuing effect of lobby groups. They argued that the US was making bad practical decisions on Israel from a "realist" view. Because Israel was in practical terms more of a burden than an asset to US foreign policy, and US support also encouraged Israel to take risks that were dangerous to its own medium- and long-term interests. Mearsheimer and Walt tend to offer policy advice of the "don't do stupid stuff" brand, the principle Obama supposedly held but he departed from it pretty drastically in practice in cases like Syria and Libya.