The current Israel-Gaza War is obviously having a major effect on Israel’s image abroad. And, in particular, it has intensified the critical attitude of Democratic voters in the US toward Israel’s occupation policies. Here are some news items that illustrate this trend.
Sen. Bernie Sanders took this public position last month:
Sen. Bernie Sanders, who has previously called to condition the aid, reintroduced that call on November 18. “The Netanyahu government, or hopefully a new Israeli government, must understand that not one penny will be coming to Israel from the U.S. unless there is a fundamental change in their military and political positions,” he said, detailing five conditions he hopes to see.
These include an end to Israel’s “indiscriminate bombing” and a “significant pause in military operations”; the right of displaced Gazans to return to their homes in the Strip; no long-term Israeli reoccupation or blockade of Gaza; an end to settler violence in the West Bank and freeze on settlement expansion; and a commitment to broad peace talks for a two-state solution following the war’s resolution.
While pro-Israel critics may dismiss Sanders as an extension of progressive House Democrats who have called for an immediate cease-fire and also attempted to formally block arms sales to Israel, the Vermont senator’s positions now appear to be largely in lockstep with the party’s mainstream.1 [my emphasis]
Phyllis Bennis of the Institute for Policy Studies just gave this interview about the urgency for a real ceasefire and for the US to back off from being such an enable of Bibi Netanyahu’s extremist war policy.2
This is former Israeli negotiator Daniel Levy, who has been a critic for years of the Israeli occupation policies, talking about the current war and the policies that preceded it.3
Salim Yaqub reviews a recent book on Arab-Israeli relations in 1967–1979 and gives a helpful summary of how Cold War considerations led the US to accept suboptimal agreements around Israel-Palestine which failed to prevent the disasters since, including the major one in progress now:
The upshot of all this was a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace process that came to fruition in the Camp David agreements of 1978 and 1979. Carter’s diplomatic triumph not only delayed the quest for a comprehensive settlement but made such a peace immeasurably harder to achieve. Egypt’s neutralization sharply reduced the military pressure on Israel, enabling it to tighten its grip on Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese territories and to ignore international calls for an end to the occupation. It’s a grim legacy that few scholars of US foreign relations, even ones who specialize in Carter’s presidency, appear to grasp. Galen Jackson brings it out with unflinching acuity.4
Similar kick-the-can-down-the-road measures not followed up by more substantive agreements have continued since.
John Mueller takes a look at what a different kind of Israeli response to the Hamas attack of October 17 could have been. It’s water under the bridge, now, of course. But it is always helpful to think about how different available options might have produced less terrible results.
[A] case can be made for the proposition that it would have been better for Israel if its understandably vehement response to the murderous Hamas incursion of October 7 had been much more limited. The response could have focused on pushing the offensive back, a few strikes against isolated targets in Gaza, shoring up border defenses, mounting covert operations to undermine Hamas, and launching a coordinated international effort to get the hostages released.
That approach would have sought to capitalize on the fact that the appeal of Hamas and its message was in decline before its attack. …
If this analysis is correct, Hamas was not deterrable by the prospect of Israeli retaliation. Indeed, in its view, a destructive response from Israel would work to its advantage by boosting its support in Gaza and elsewhere and by alienating those Arab countries that had signed, or, like Saudi Arabia, might have soon signed, the Abraham Accords. For the most part, of course, this has happened, at least so far.
Internationally, Israel enjoyed much sympathy when it was the sole victim. But much of this was dissipated when Israel reacted by killing far more civilians and destroying far more property than the Hamas invaders.5 [my emphasis]
Definitely a road not taken, in this case.
One can only hope that the US is making a serious review of the supposedly super-effective Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the intelligence services have performed before and during this war:
Multiple reports in recent days reveal that Israel was aware that Hamas had built mock Israeli communities to train for a major assault, even ending one massive drill with the words “We have completed the killing of everyone on the kibbutz,” but intelligence warnings were largely dismissed as “fantasy.”
A BBC investigation published Tuesday found that Hamas had been training for the mission for nearly three years and had published multiple explicit images and videos on social media.
The videos show Hamas training in mock Israeli communities, going room to room killing people, blowing their way through gates painted yellow like those in border kibbutzim, and taking civilians and soldiers hostage. One of the practice sites was less than a mile from the border with Israel.6 [my emphasis]
And if peace is the actual goal, immediately blocking the escalating settler violence and property theft in the West Bank would be an excellent move.7
Samuels, Ben (2023): Conditioning U.S. Military Aid to Israel Triggers Fierce Debate Among Democrats. Haaretz 11/28/2023. <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2023-11-28/ty-article/.premium/conditioning-u-s-military-aid-to-israel-triggers-fierce-debate-among-democrats/0000018c-1686-d5be-af9f-3e9f41580000> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).
“The U.S. and Israel Stand Alone”: World Demands Ceasefire as Gaza Death Toll Tops 20,000. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 12/21/2023. (Accessed: 2023-21-12).
Former Israeli negotiator's perspective on the war in Gaza-Centre Stage. Al Jazeera English YouTube channel 12/21/2023. (Accessed: 2023-21-12).
Yaqub, Salim (2023): American and Israeli Intransigence Prevented Peace in the Middle East. Catalyst 06/29/2023. <https://catalyst-journal.com/2023/06/galen-jackson-a-lost-peace-review> (Accessed: 2023-14-08).
Mueller, John (2023): What if Israel didn't set out to 'destroy Hamas'? Responsible Statecraft 11/21/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-disproportionate-response-gaza/> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).
Hamas ended exercise in mock Israeli town: ‘We have killed everyone on the kibbutz’. Times of Israel 11/29/2023. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-ended-exercise-in-mock-israeli-town-we-have-killed-everyone-on-the-kibbutz/> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).
Eyewitness testimony and footage reveals escalation in Israel's occupation tactics in West Bank. CNN 12/08/2023. <https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/12/08/west-bank-hebron-settlers-idf-elbagir-pkg-intl-ldn-vpx.cnn> (Accesssed: 2023-21-12).
Amid a Settler Onslaught, Protective Presence Activism Falters. Jewish Currents 11/28/2023. <https://jewishcurrents.org/amid-a-settler-onslaught-protective-presence-activism-falters> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).