The new phase of the Russia-Ukraine War

The Russia-Ukraine War is stuck in what is often called a stalemate, although at this point it appears that Russia has more offensive capabilities than Ukraine. The tone of the Biden Administration is clearly shifting in response to a variety of pressures, including Republican opposition to continued funding and the pressure to shift American diplomatic more toward Asia and less toward Europe and the Middle East. Being in the position of vetoing a UN Security Council resolution for another “humanitarian [temporary] ceasefire” in the Israel-Gaza War, as it did yesterday, is not a good position for the US to be in, particularly since the threat of a wider war there is still very real.

The United States on Friday vetoed a proposed United Nations Security Council demand for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in the war between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza, diplomatically isolating Washington as it shields its ally.

Thirteen other members voted in favor of a brief draft resolution, put forward by the United Arab Emirates, while Britain abstained. The vote came after U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres made a rare move on Wednesday to formally warn the 15-member council of a global threat from the two-month long war.¹

On the Ukraine front, Alexander Motyl and Dennis Soltys argue that the current situation is more “stasis” than “stalemate.” The use of the word "stalemate" by General Valeriy Zaluzhny, the Ukraine Armed Forces' Supreme Commander, they write:

… was unfortunate because stasis, not stalemate, is the better term for conditions on the battlefield. … Three months of a minimally successful counteroffensive [by Ukraine] do not make for impossible or useless action, just as the fact that the front line has not moved much does not necessarily mean stalemate. If that were the case, then one would have to conclude that General Petain was correct in believing that the German invasion of France had resulted in a stalemate that made further French resistance impossible or useless. According to this logic, Winston Churchill should have caved as well. In fact, both the Russians and Ukrainians are fully committed to actions that will produce significant changes on the front, perhaps not immediately but within a few months.²

They argue that Putin is not at a point where he is willing to negotiate a long-term settlement. But the reason they give is basically that Putin is evil. There doesn’t seem to be any serious Russian signals they are ready to negotiate such an agreement. But that probably means that the Russians still see military advantages for themselves that could allow them to take more Ukrainian territory.

There still seems little reason to believe that Russia is out to seize all of Ukraine in any short term, even if they could. Keeping Ukraine out of NATO and leaving the Ukrainian government in control of only a portion of their territory is more likely the maximum goal they would be aiming for at this time. Russia currently controls about a fifth of Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

Motyl and Soltys are essentially making an argument for the US and NATO to do everything they can to continue the war:

[T]here is no rationale for Ukraine to make concessions and, in effect, agree to capitulation. Instead, Ukraine’s Western partners should ask themselves whether their role model is Petain or Churchill, and then, presumably having chosen the latter, they should steady the course and help Ukraine end the war through the timely provision of weapons in sufficient quantity.

“Petain or Churchill,” because for chronic fans of Forever War, any foreign foe of the US is always “Hitler” and Neville Chamberlain is always on the verge of capitulating to Hitler at Munich. This kind of threat inflation is much more often harmful than helpful.

This DW News report on the stalemate question really presses the Ukrainian representative in a way that we scarcely ever see on American TV³:

It’s notable here how very much more polished and evocative Israeli spokespeople are in speaking to Western audiences about supporting them militarily. They’ve had a lot more practice at it. Israel may not be as immediately dependent on US assistance as Ukraine. But they are both very dependent on it. And Israeli spokespeople have no hesitation in trying to shame American audiences in particular into supporting their policies with military assistance.

Anatol Lieven argues:

Russia is now attacking in its turn; and although so far its forces also have made only very slow progress, time does not appear to be on Ukraine’s side. Russia has some four times Ukraine’s population and 14 times its GDP, which give it huge advantages in what has become a war of attrition. Serious imbalances in the U.S. and European military industries mean that Russia is also producing far more shells than Ukraine is receiving from the West.

Ukraine’s victories in the first months of the war were due to the courage and grit of Ukrainian soldiers, certain particularly effective Western weapons, and extremely bad Russian planning. They were also, however, attributable to the fact that Ukraine was able to mobilize more men than Russia, due to President Putin’s hesitation over increasing conscription. That advantage has now been reversed.

Moreover, as recent developments in the U.S. Congress and in Europe make clear, there can be no guarantee that Western aid will continue at levels sufficient to allow Ukraine to continue the fight successfully.

There is therefore no realistic prospect that Ukraine can significantly improve its existing position on the battlefield. The West can provide more weapons, but it cannot generate additional Ukrainian soldiers. Ukraine is facing greater and greater difficulties in recruiting troops; meanwhile, Russia is calling up reserves and continually strengthening its defensive lines in southern and eastern Ukraine.⁴

Ivo Daalder advocates continued aid for Ukraine but also explains on the “stalemate” issue, also highlighting some of the finger-pointing by American officials now coming more to light:

… American military officials and analysts I have spoken to lay the blame on Ukrainian tactics and political decisions, which have made achieving a military breakthrough more difficult.

They fault two critical decisions for this: First, they insist that if Ukraine had massed its armored forces more effectively, it could have broken through the surprisingly dense minefields — even though initial casualties were high when forces tried to breach them. But instead, Ukraine withdrew its forces and resorted to large-scale artillery and missile strikes against Russian defense, making little headway on the ground and depleting sparse ammunition supplies.

Equally problematic, U.S. critics argue, was the decision to try and breach Russia’s defenses at multiple points, rather than concentrating forces for a single decisive breakthrough. For example, Zelenskyy and other officials insisted on trying to recapture the town of Bakhmut, which Russia had conquered after months of bloody fighting. Even today, Ukraine deploys more forces in and around Bakhmut than any other point along the front line.

In all likelihood, all these explanations bare some truth. Washington should have sent more advanced capabilities sooner; technology likely does favor the defense on this battlefield; and Ukraine’s military and political leaders made judgements about where and how to fight, which made success less likely. History will be the ultimate judge of each justification.⁵ [my emphasis]

Aside from the Russia-Ukraine War giving the US and NATO the chance to weaken Russia without direct clashes between NATO and Russian troops, are fossil fuels involved in Western goals there?

U.S. officials view the war in Ukraine as a way of achieving geopolitical objectives in the Black Sea, an energy-rich region that connects Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

At two recent Senate hearings, State Department officials portrayed the war as a means of transforming the geopolitics of energy in the Black Sea. As long as Ukrainians keep fighting, they said, there remains a potential to transform the Black Sea into a new market for the European Union. The officials envisioned a new energy corridor that provides Europe with oil and natural gas from Central Asia.⁶

This doesn’t mean that anyone should reduce the conflict to a cynical “it’s all about oil” affair. Energy supplies are a critical geopolitical issue. Germany and the EU spent decades trying to establish mutually beneficial energy business, of which the Nord Stream pipelines were a major part, with a distinct political purpose of reducing the likelihood of military conflicts between the West and Russia.

Undoubtedly, the kind of major push by the US, Europe and other nations to shift their energy sources to batteries, wind turbines, and solar panels will also be useful in reducing private-profit incentive for war over petroleum resources.

Mark Episkopos also cautions against the “stalemate” evaluation:

[T]he widespread view that the war has entered a stalemate, and many of the policy prescriptions stemming from this notion, have invited a growing degree of expert scrutiny. “I see no durable or stable stalemate at this stage,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The present inability of either side to establish a decisive advantage is not structural. Extrapolating from the present phase of the war into the future is an exercise fraught with error in my view,” Kofman added.

George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy at QI [the Quincy Institute], highlighted the perils of extrapolating a “stalemate” from the current lack of significant battlefield movements in Ukraine. “Those who believe this war has settled into a long-term stalemate make the mistake of measuring the relative progress of each side with maps. They see that the frontlines have not moved significantly over the last year and conclude that the sides are stalemated,” Beebe told me.

“But other metrics, though, paint a different picture. Ukraine is using up its quite limited supplies of men, weapons, and ammunition, and the West cannot provide what Ukraine needs. That is not a formula for stalemate; it's a formula for Ukraine's eventual collapse or capitulation,” he continued.⁷

1. Nichols, Michelle (2023): US blocks UN Security Council demand for humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. Reuters 12/08/2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-vote-delayed-demand-gaza-humanitarian-ceasefire-2023-12-08/> Accessed: 2023-09-12).

2. Motyl, Alexander & Soltys, Dennis (2023): Stasis is not Stalemate in the Ukraine War. The National Interest 11/29/2023. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/stasis-not-stalemate-ukraine-war-207592> Accessed: 2023-09-12).

3. Can Kyiv still defeat Russia? Conflict Zone. DW News 11/29/2023. (Accessed: 2023-29-11).

4. Lieven, Anatol (2023): Biden's role in Ukraine peace is clear now. Responsible Statecraft 11/29/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-peace-talks-2666384435/> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).

5. Daalder, Ivo (2023): Stalemate best describes the state of war in Ukraine. Politico EU 11/27/2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/stalemate-best-describes-the-state-of-war-in-ukraine/> (Accessed: 2023-09-12).

6. Hunt, Edward (2023): The Ukraine war has been a 'great bargain' for US in the Black Sea. Responsible Statecraft 11/21/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-war-black-sea/> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).

7. Episkopos, Mark (2023): Is it worse than 'stalemate' in Ukraine right now? Responsible Statecraft 11/27/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-war-stalemate-2666354627/> (Accessed: 2023-29-11).