The Russia-Ukraine War, one year in

A few points on the first anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Great powers can make dumb foreign policy moves, and often do

With the recent debate so preoccupied with NATO countries providing arms to Ukraine, Anatol Lieven¹ reminds us of a critical fact about the Russia-Ukraine War.

A year ago, all but one of Russia’s chief aims in Ukraine were defeated in the first three weeks of the war, before the arrival of Western heavy weaponry. The reasons for this comprehensive Russian reverse — which no Western observer, including myself, predicted — are of great interest to military analysts, even if some of the lessons they teach are very old ones.

Between the start of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, and the middle of March, Russian forces failed to take the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv; failed to take Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, though it is less than 20 miles from the Russian frontier; failed to occupy the whole of the Donbas; and failed to capture Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. The only Russian bridgehead established west of the Dnieper River, at Kherson, was so limited that it ultimately proved untenable. [my emphasis]

This is mostly due to major misjudgments on the part of the Russian leadership. They underestimated the willingness and ability of the Ukrainians to fight back effectively. And they weren’t alone in that. The US and other NATO countries were also surprised at how effectively Ukraine fought back. The training the US in particularly had been providing was, according to the news reports at the time, were focused on preparing Ukrainians to wage a guerilla war against a Russian occupation, not a conventional war like the one we now have.

And, inevitably connected with that underassessment, the Russian side overestimated the effectiveness of their own invasion force, as Lieven describes in further detail in his article.

With all the obsession we still see with comparisons to the Second World War both by the West and by Russia, this is a reminder that lessons of past conflicts need to be taken in their practical context and not carelessly elevated to timeless rules.

Nuclear war risks

The risk of nuclear war is clearly higher than it was a year ago. In his February 21 speech on the anniversary of the invasion, Putin announced that he was suspending the New START Treaty of 2010, and the Duma proceeded on making the suspension official.²

Steve Fetter³ explains that while this further move away from nuclear arms control is a bad development, the exact meaning of the announcement of “suspension” isn’t immediately obvious:

[I]t isn’t clear what suspension means. Inspections were already suspended, and Russia was refusing to restart them.

And if that’s the only measure, then it doesn’t really have much effect. There’s nothing new. …

I think we should respond by asking Putin to reconsider the decision, by pointing out that it is in Russia’s interests, as well as the United States’, to avoid an unconstrained nuclear competition, an arms race. We should be able to pursue our strong shared interest in avoiding an arms race and in supporting the nonproliferation regime. We were able to do this during the Cold War, even during the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars, when we were on opposite sides of those conflicts. That did not prevent us from engaging in arms control negotiations and treaties. And the war in Ukraine makes New START even more important by providing some stability and predictability in the strategic nuclear relationship.

So I think we should point this out; we should not make any hasty moves. We should, of course, remain in compliance, and call on Russia to comply with the treaty. [my emphasis]

Gerhard Mangott⁴ of the University of Innsbruck has been one of the more solid commentators on the war that I’ve encountered in the last year, thinks the Russian threat to use nuclear weapons is so far a bluff. But he warns that if Crimea is in real danger of being retaken by Ukraine, that would be the most likely situation that Putin might consider the bluff called and decide to employ a tactical nuke.

He notes that the anti-Russian hawks eagerly dismiss that possibility.

No formal peace talks yet in sight

At this point, it would be hard to find something that we could call major opposition movements in the West to the current NATO policies. As more people are starting to notice now, the countries of the Global South are not pleased to see the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But they are also generally cautious about backing the NATO counter-effort.

Eva Konzett provides a good summary of the issues related to formal negotiations to end the war in the Vienna weekly Falter⁵. She touches on the following points:

1. Both sides in the conflict will have to get a point where they think stopping the war is preferable to continuing it. On the Western side, that argues for continuing to support Ukraine with supplies and other military support at the moment.

2. The Ukraine-Russia agreement on grain shipments currently in effect is due to inspire next month and any extension must be negotiated, which could also provide an opportunity for serious negotiations on a wider range of issue. Though she notes that Moscow has so far not indicated any willingness to widen that negotiation.

3. A bad peace deal that makes a new war more rather than less likely would be a undesirable outcome.

4. Any peace settlement in the forseeable future will probably include at least some transition arrangement on some of the territory occupied by Russia since 2014.

5. An agreement on Ukraine’s part not to join the EU could be part of a peace agreement. She doesn’t mention Ukraine staying out of NATO, but that is also an option. She also does not mention that the practical possibility of joining either would be years away even the war stopped immediately. These are not loosely aligned clubs but elaborately integrated international organizations with rigorous requirements that cannot be easily waved.

6. China has clearly indicated publicly that it does not look favorably on the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.

How well are the sanctions against Russia working?

Politico EU⁶:

Most EU diplomats and officials involved in European sanctions policy stressed the goal was never, realistically, to make Russia pull back its troops. Instead, the aim was to weaken the Kremlin's war machine by denying Putin the financing he needs. 

But despite early predictions, the Russian economy has not collapsed as a result of the Western trading freeze. Timely interventions by Russia’s Central Bank, revenues from remaining energy exports and a pivot toward new markets have buffered the blow.

One year into the war, this raises the question: Was all the effort and economic hardship in Europe really worth it? The debate is a current one, as the EU mulls its 10th round of sanctions ahead of the anniversary of Russia's invasion on February 24.

Sanctions are standard instruments in international conflicts. But as an alternative to war, restrained expectations about the value of economic sanctions are advisable. Unless their country’s economy is completely devastated, sanctions are not going to deter a nation from doing something its leadership considers in its own vital national interest.

And when it comes to financing a war in particular, Paul Steinhardt⁷ pointed out a couple of weeks after Russia’s 2022 invasion that not only does Russia borrow in its own currency. It’s a petrostate. As he wrote a couple of weeks after the 2022 invasion:

Now, it’s obvious that the Russian state does not need money in foreign currency via loans. Because their financial assets far exceed its corresponding debts. [A] state with its own currency does not have to borrow from anyone to pay its expenses. So, in short, Russia's problem is certainly not the risk of default.

His problem is primarily the falling ruble exchange rate, which makes his imports massively more expensive. Admittedly, a home-grown problem: by floating the ruble in 2014, Russia exposed itself to the "whims" of the foreign exchange markets – and in particular to the politics of "the West". But there are alternatives: foreign-exchange management.

While neoclassical economists denounce this as "dirigiste," it has proven to be extremely beneficial to the development of the Chinese economy. A country that, like Russia, has raw materials that the whole world needs does not need a reserve currency. It can get everything in rubles that the world that needs these commodities has to offer, as long as it obliges its exporters to have their bills paid in rubles. [my emphasis]

Andrew Cockburn⁸ provides a current update:

The Russian currency is trading slightly higher than at the time of the invasion. Inflation is at almost the same level.  Moscow shops continue to offer a full range of western consumer goods, while e-commerce trade with the outside world has actually grown by 30 percent. The IMF is projecting that the Russian economy will actually grow this year and next. Despite baroque efforts to crimp Putin’s oil export income, “Urals crude” continues to flow at levels — roughly four million barrels a day — unchanged from pre-war levels, not least through Indian, Turkish, Chinese, and Senegalese refineries, whence it moves unimpeded into European gas tanks and power plants.

Such blatant circumvention of the sanctions regime is studiously ignored by the sanctioneers, since it is necessary to ward off catastrophic energy price inflation in western economies. Efforts to at least crimp the price at which Russia sells its oil via a “price cap” mechanism appear to have had little effect: Asian refiners are reportedly paying full price.  (In a less publicized example of officially endorsed sanctions evasion, Russian exports of enriched uranium, originally mined in Kazakhstan, are duly labeled “Kasakh” and continue to power U.S. reactors.) [my emphasis]

It’s worth noting here that the EU has not completely cut itself off from Russian fossil fuels. Austria, Hungary, and Latvia are still notably dependent of Russian gas supplies.⁹

Two totally unsurprising facts about the war

The Munich Security Conference¹⁰ this year provided at least two notable cases of: the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Perhaps appropriate for the location, the Munich Analogy we have with us always:

For some attendees, the vibe in the crowded Bayerischer Hof hotel where the gathering takes place carried echoes of 1938. That year, the Bavarian capital hosted a conference that resulted in the infamous Munich Agreement, in which European powers ceded the Sudetenland to Germany in a misguided effort they believed could preserve peace.

“We all know that there is a storm brewing outside, but here inside the Bayerischer Hof all seems normal,” wrote Andrew Michta, dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the Germany-based Marshall Center. “It all seems so routine, and yet it all changes suddenly when a Ukrainian parliamentarian pointedly tells the audience we are failing to act fast enough.”

To be fair, we can say that Both Sides Do It. Putin in his speech talked about the “Nazi” government in Kyiv to invoke the memory of the victorious outcome for the USSR/Russia in the Second World War, called the Great Patriotic War in Russia.

And then there is this critical continuity: “The only people smiling at this year’s security conference are the defense contractors. Arms sales are booming by all accounts.”

1. Lieven, Anatol (2023): Russia was defeated in the first three weeks. Responsible Statecraft 02/22/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/20/russia-was-defeated-in-the-first-three-weeks/> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

2. Russia's parliament moves to suspend New START nuclear treaty. Reuters 02/22/2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-dumas-speaker-says-us-destroyed-international-stability-2023-02-22/> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

3. Mecklin, John (2023):Interview: Steve Fetter on the meaning of Putin’s New START announcement. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 02/21/2023. <https://thebulletin.org/2023/02/interview-steve-fetter-on-the-meaning-of-putins-new-start-announcement/#post-heading> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

4. Mangott, Gerhard (2023): “Ich denke nicht…”. Twitter thread 02/21/2023. <> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

5. Konzett, Eva (2023): Warum wird nicht verhandelt? Falter 08-2023. <https://www.falter.at/zeitung/20230222/warum-wird-nicht-verhandelt/_badaa0e961> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

6. Moens, Barbarea & Kijewski, Leonie (2023): Western sanctions didn’t stop the war. Were they worth it? Politico EU 02/20/2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/western-sanction-russia-ukraine-war-trade-energy/> (Accessed: 2023-22-02). My translation from the German.

7. Steinhardt, Paul (2023): Hurra! Russland steht vor der Staatspleite. Makroskop 09.03.2022. <https://makroskop.eu/09-2022/hurra-russland-steht-vor-der-staatspleite/> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

8. Cockburn, Andrew (2023): We were promised ‘economic shock and awe’ against Russia. Responsible Statecraft 02/22/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/22/are-sanctions-hurting-the-us-more-than-russia/> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

9. Bruckner, Regina (2023): Warum Österreich so sehr an Russlands Erdgastropf hängt. Der Standard 21.02.2023. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000143785105/warum-oesterreich-so-sehr-an-russlands-erdgastropf-haengt> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).

10. Karnitschnig, Matthew (2023): It’s the end of the world as we know it - and Munich feels nervous. Politico EU 02/20/2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/munich-security-conference-ukraine-russia-war-china-wang-yi-nato/> (Accessed: 2023-22-02).