The short Russia-Georgia war in 2008
I was disappointed to read recently that the German government plans to reduce its funding for the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), an office which promotes political education by publishing informative and analytical material on a variety of current and historical topics and holds educational events and podcasts.
Their work is aimed at a general audience, but they also maintain good editorial and scholarly standards. I would hate to see their constructive and useful work curtailed.
A recent online article of theirs was about the brief war in Georgia in 2008 between Georgia and Russia, fifteen years ago.1 It’s a useful anniversary-year reminder of that event.
There is a “frozen conflict” left from the end of the Soviet Union, with Georgia claiming the regions of South Ossetia (Südossetien) and Abchasien (Abkhazia), both of which are de facto controlled by Russia. The provinces are shown on this bpb map:
The article summarizes the events of 2008 this way:
The War of the Caucasus was both an internal conflict in Georgia and an interstate conflict between the country and Russia. The fighting began on the night of August 8, 2008, when then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili gave the order for a military operation in the breakaway region of South Ossetia. The fighting ended on 12 August 2008 with the agreement on an EU-brokered six-point plan to defuse the military conflict in Georgia. About 850 people were killed in the clashes and more than 190,000 people were temporarily displaced as a result of the war, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Some of them are still living as internally displaced persons.
The meaning and significance of a military conflict is not determined by who shot first. But Georgia shot first in this one. The Bush-Cheney Administration wasn’t willing to unconditionally back Saakashvili’s action:
Speaking on CNN, Mr. Saakashvili compared Russia's intervention in Georgia to the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. Russia has massively overreacted to the situation in Georgia. It has hit targets across Georgia, well beyond South Ossetia, and has killed both Georgian military personnel as well as civilians. The international community is right to condemn this illegal attack on an independent country and United Nations member.
But this is not a repeat of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior of the last century. So far at least, Russia's aims have been clear: to oust Georgian forces from the territory of South Ossetia, one of two secessionist enclaves in Georgia, and to chasten a Saakashvili government that Russia perceives as hot-headed and unpredictable.
Regardless of the conflict's origins, the West must continue to act diplomatically to push Georgia and Russia back to the pre-attacks status quo. The United States should make it clear that Saakashvili has seriously miscalculated the meaning of his partnership with Washington, and that Georgia and Russia must step back before they do irreparable damage to their relations with the US, NATO, and the European Union.2
But Russia provided military support to South Ossetia. And has worked to establish stronger ties with both regions since then. The year 2008 was the year the confrontation between the US and Russia over NATO enlargement reached a new level of intensity when NATO formally declared that Georgia and Ukraine would both eventually become members of NATO, even though neither was formally accepted as a candidate then.3
Billmon, one of the stars of the early years of blogging, wrote about the war at the time. The original link is dead, but I’ll repeat my summary from the time.4 His entry for 08/18/2008, Anatomy of A(nother) Fiasco, he reminded us that a lot of the most questionable assumptions underpinning US foreign policy in 2008 that were shared by most Republicans and many Democrats.
As he noted, our European allies supported some expansions of NATO, e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic. But they didn't share the enthusiasm of Cheney and Bush for incorporating countries like Georgia and Ukraine. Plus, it would be highly problematic to make a formal defense alliance with Georgia at a time when it is not in undisputed control of territory it claims as its own, i.e., South Ossetia and Abkhasia.
Billmon also recalled that in 2007, Congress passed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act5, which authorized treatment of Georgia and Ukraine as de facto allies of the United States, at least in terms of providing weapons sales and advisers on similar terms to those received by formal NATO allies. This reckless piece of legislation was sponsored by those famous "moderate" Republicans Dick Lugar and Chuck Hagel, along with Democrats Joe Biden and Chris Dodd and the legendary Republican Maverick John McCain.
Earlier in 2008, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden joined with John McCain and Joe Lieberman to sponsor another resolution "demanding that NATO open its doors to the Ukraine and Georgia." There was even a subsequent Congressional resolution passed supporting Georgia and blasting Russia. Both parties could have been a lot more careful about sending signals to volatile regimes that can be easily misinterpreted or create openings for lobbyists to make mischief. They still could be.
With South Ossetia and Abkhazia still both effectively under Russian control, admitting Georgia to NATO in that situation would basically mean that NATO would be committing to go to war with Russia. Russia has also formally recognized the two regions as independent republics. A similar situation exists on a much larger scale with Ukraine.
As Sarah Mendelson wrote in 2008 during the brief conflict:
This conflict is a tragedy for the people of this region. Instead of negotiating over the hotels, golf courses, and resorts that ought to be built along Georgia’s Black Sea coast, bringing tourists and needed revenue to the citizens of the region, Russia and Georgia have gone to war. At this moment, it is hard to see where or how the conflict will end. The Georgian government has called for a ceasefire. There are also fears that Russia might overrun Georgia, bringing down the government of Mikhail Sakashvili through the use of force. Whatever the outcome, Russia has all but obliterated Georgia’s possibility of joining NATO as it cannot belong to this alliance if it has unresolved border disputes. Russia has successfully burned Georgia’s NATO card. [my emphasis]6
But the NATO poker goes on:
The conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia has put a strain on relations between Russia and Georgia to this day: as a result of the war, the two states broke off diplomatic relations. Trade relations between Russia and Georgia were gradually resumed in 2012. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a discreet (one-time) agreement granting visa-free travel to Georgian citizens and resuming civil air traffic between the two countries for the first time since 2019.
On 3 March 2022, Georgia applied for EU membership. In any case, further reforms must take place in Georgia before EU candidate status can be achieved, according to the EU Commission. The Georgian Foreign Minister attended the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023 as a guest. NATO is also demanding further (democratic) reforms from Georgia as a condition of accession.7
Georgia at the time of the 2008 conflict had 2,000 soldiers in Iraq as part of the US-led “coalition of the willing.” Juan Cole suggested that Georgia’s participation in the Iraq War was at least part of the Russian consideration in their military action in South Ossetia.8
Ukraine also contributed over 5,000 troops to the Iraq War.9
Der Kaukasuskrieg 2008. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb) 01.08.2023. <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/hintergrund-aktuell/523728/der-kaukasuskrieg-2008/> (Accessed: 2023-08-08). Translations from the German are mine.
King, Charles (2008): Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault. Christian Science Monitor 08/011/2008. <https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0811/p09s03-coop.html> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).
Galli, Paul (2008): The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008. CRS Report for Congress 05/05/2008/. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RS22847.pdf> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).
Miller, Bruce (2008): Billmon on Georgia, the US and our dysfunctional foreign policy elite. Contradicciones (Original) 08/18/2008. <https://oldhickorysweblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/billmon-on-georgia-us-and-our.html> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).
S.494: NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007. ProPublica n/d. <https://projects.propublica.org/represent/bills/110/s494> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).
Mendelson, Sarah (2008): An August War in the Caucasus. Center for Strategic and International Studies 08/11/2008. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/august-war-caucasus> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).
Der Kaukasuskrieg 2008, op. cit.
Cole, Juan (2008): 2000 Georgian Troops Leaving ... .Infomred Comment 08/09/2008. <https://www.juancole.com/2008/08/2000-georgian-troops-leaving-huge-blast.html> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).
Foliente, Rodney (2008): Ukrainians complete mission in Iraq. U.S. Army 12/11/2008. <https://www.army.mil/article/15056/ukrainians_complete_mission_in_iraq> (Accessed: 2023-08-08).