Ukraine forever war?
The German Phoenix channel recently featured a discussion on the Russia-Ukraine war with four journalists, Simone Brunner (Die Zeit), Viktor Funk (Table Media), Can Merey (RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland) and Helga Schmidt (WDR).1
At one point, Schmidt makes this observation, saying the one of Putin’s goals in the current war was “to embed the West” in this war. She adds that she thiks Putin intended to incorporate all of Ukraine, which remains speculation, but she takes that to be it’s second most important war priority. (Presumably the first one to keep Ukraine out of NATO.)
This idea that Russia intends to take over all of Ukraine is often stated by pundits and commentators, and is not totally implausible. But, so far as I’m aware, the Russian government has never stated that as an explicit aim. Über-Realist John Mearsheimer argues based on Russia’s initial invasion strategy that the goal was to annex much or all of the Donbas area, to take the capital Kyiv, and declare an new government in Kyiv that would be essentially a puppet government controlling all of eastern Ukraine not formally annexed to Russia. This would leave a rump independent Ukraine that would be economically and militarily weak, or even become a “failed state.”
Schmidt continues, arguing that Putin “wants the West to intervene more strongly. He wants the West to send troops into Ukraine. And he also wants them to then decide to make Ukraine a member of NATO.”2
This is a surprising suggestion and seems unlikely. I haven’t heard it speculated before that Putin wanted the West to intervene militarily. But it does recall this analysis by David Sacks at Responsible Statecraft:
An article in the New York Times on Wednesday claimed that pressure is building on Biden to announce a timetable for Ukrainian membership in NATO at its Vilnius Summit next month.
Supposedly Biden is “isolated” among NATO allies in his reluctance to do so, even though that claim is contradicted by the story’s own last paragraph (the one that Noam Chomsky once quipped should be read first), which acknowledges that “others argue more quietly” that NATO membership “could give Mr. Putin more incentive to continue the war, or to escalate it.”
Indeed, since Moscow has already declared NATO membership for Ukraine to be completely unacceptable and an existential threat — the prevention of which is one of its chief war aims — a Vilnius Declaration that Ukraine will join NATO when the war ends will effectively ensure that the war goes on forever. It will also take off the table the West’s central bargaining chip to achieve peace, which is a neutral Ukraine.3 [my emphasis]
Schmidt may have been getting at something similar to Sacks’ point, which is that direct conflict with NATO troops or continued insistence that Ukraine will become part of NATO essentially guarantees that there will be no peace agreement anytime in the near future.
When the moderator asks the panel if they think the current, much-discussed Ukrainian counteroffensive will put an end to the war, all respond with some version of, “nein.”
Merey comments pessimistically that only Ukrainians are still optimistic about a near-term victory.
Funk describes the current situation in what is currently a war of attrition as one in which the Russians are fighting on the defensive and have had time to prepare strong defensive positions. It’s generally assumed in these situations that the defending side has the advantage, i.e., that the advancing side will have to pay a higher price in lives, equipment, and ammunition. He stresses that neither side seems to be ready to seriously pursue any kind of peace negotiations at this moment.
The Phoenix panel also discusses concerns that with the approach of the US Presidential election in 2024, the US may be inclined to shift more of the burden for supporting Ukraine to European countries.
Merey repeats the common hawkish claim that if Ukraine loses this war, Russia will then move to attack Modova and the Baltic states, the latter of which are NATO members. After the invasion of the Ukraine has become such a mess and burden for them? Of course, accepting the Baltic states into NATO meant that NATO has to have plans in place to defend those countries against their most likely military danger, an invasion by Russia.
But Ukraine as the first in a series of dominos isn’t a convincing metaphor.
Merey does make a relevant point about taking Ukraine into NATO with part of its territory under Russian control, which is that NATO did take West Germany into NATO even though the country was divided into East and West Germany. However, the recognition of East and West Germany as part of the agreements at the end of the Second World War can scarcely be compared to Crimea and the Donbas under Russian occupation today.
One not-at-all-insignificant difference is that the Western Allies had formally recognized Soviet occupation of eastern Germany. And Western Germany had de facto accepted it, though it always kept unification of the country as an official long-range goal. There was also a still controversial offer by the Soviets to allow unification of German in exchange for German neutrality, which became known as the Stalin Note incident.4 But the proposal never went anywhere.
It would be possible to do something similar with Ukraine. But not only would Ukraine have to agree with it. Russia and the NATO countries including especially the US would have to accept it as an indefinite redrawing of national boundaries like with East and West Germany, whatever euphemistic label we might pin on it.
And in any case, a near-term accession of Ukraine to NATO is unlikely in the extreme, unless the standards for becoming a NATO ally are radically reduced. Ukraine is not Finland, which could quickly be approved for formal membership because it already met the standards.
Helga Schmidt on the panel also expressed major doubt about whether Ukraine would be able to quickly join NATO, as does Simone Brunner.
presseclub: Ukrainische Offensive - entscheidet sich jetzt der Krieg? Phoenix YouTube channel 18.06.2023. (Accessed: 2023-18-06).
After 10:40 in the video. Translation from German is mine.
Sacks, David (2023): Will upcoming NATO summit launch forever war in Europe? Responsible Statecraft 06/16/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/06/16/will-upcoming-nato-summit-launch-forever-war-in-europe/> (Accessed 06/19/2023).
See: Ruggenthaler, Peter (2011): The 1952 Stalin Note on German Unification: The Ongoing Debate. Journal of Cold War Studies 13:4, 172-212. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26924047> (Accessed: 2023-19-06).
Meyer, Fritjof (2008): Hat Stalin geblufft? Neue Aktenfunde zur Sowjetnote von 1952. Osteuropa 58:3, 157-161. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44934571> (Accessed: 2023-19-06).