Ukraine: What does the war's endgame look like?
Ukraine: What does the war's endgame look like?
“All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out.” I.F. Stone, 1967
“There are no agreements for Russia. Any agreements with Russia will only lead to the next stage of aggression.” - Mychajlo Podoljak, adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, this week
Podoljak in an interview with Austria’s Der Standard sounded like someone auditioning for a remake of Dr. Strangelove.1 But even though he was in full don’t-look-up mode, he’s an official adviser to the Ukrainian President and used “we” in speaking of Ukrainian policy. And the hashish he was handing out sounded like it must be mixed with crack cocaine.
But governments at war use their hashish smoke signals to send different messages to different audiences. So they require interpretation.
Some kind of consensus on the likely end of the Russia-Ukraine War among informed observers seems to be emerging. Failing some unpredictable series of events that cause one of those two governments to suddenly collapse, they will agree in some way to a “frozen conflict,” with Russia controlling more of Ukrainian territory that it did at the start of February 2022. Almost no one is likely to be entirely happy with such a state of affairs.
The war is occurring almost exclusively on Ukrainian territory. And the longer the war continues, the greater the damage to Ukraine will be.
The current war of attrition
The two sides are currently locked in a 1914-style war of attrition. According to the current figures from the World Population Review2, Ukraine has 209 thousand soldiers on active duty, with 209 thousand paramilitary forces, and 900 thousand reservists.
Russia has one million on active duty, 554 thousand paramilitary, and 2 million reservists. Russia is the biggest country in the world, so it has lots of other border territory to defend. But Ukraine is the only border on which they have a war currently under way. Their most powerful neighbor by far is China, for which Russia is a junior partner. China has no incentive to help Ukraine and NATO by raising military tensions on its Russian border, just the opposite.
There is a standard ratio that is widely used that an attacker needs a 3:1 ratio of troops against a defender. That ratio worked to Ukraine’s advantage in the initial phase of the war when Russia was trying to seize Kiev and capture a larger piece of eastern and central Ukraine.
But the fact that Ukraine is in a defensive war in which Russia is the aggressor doesn’t mean that the 3:1 ratio applies to the entire war. It applies to the battlefield on which the war is being fought. So when Ukraine is fighting to retake lost territory currently held and defended by Russia, its the Ukrainian army that is that attacker and the Russian army the defender. And that has been the case during Ukraine 2023 counteroffensive.
Fred Kaplan analyzes that counteroffensive, arguing that both sides see problems for the other side that currently give them hope for their own side.3 From Ukraine’s viewpoint, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent internal troubles could be taken as a sign of major regime weakness.
Though no one is saying so explicitly, political developments may be feeding hopes on both sides. CIA director William Burns recently said in a public interview that the recent coup attempt by mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin exposed “signs of weakness” in Vladimir Putin’s regime, especially given the fact that Putin had to make a deal with his challenger—who used to be his chef—rather than simply bat him down. During Prigozhin’s 36-hour march on Moscow, Putin and his entire security apparatus seemed to be adrift. Burns said some in Moscow’s elite must be asking, “Does the emperor have no clothes?” Or at least, “Why is it taking so long for him to get dressed?” He went so far as to invite disgruntled Russian officers and officials to defect, or at least to become CIA informants.
This disarray—if that’s what it is—hasn’t yet had a visible effect on Putin’s absolute control or on the performance of Russia’s army in Ukraine. But it might. [my emphasis]
Zelenskyy’s adviser Mychajlo Podoljak is very enthusiastic on expressing hope for regime collapse.
But Kaplan also sees political as well as military reasons for optimism on Russia’s side, reasons that could encourage Zelenskyy to seek aa near-term ceasefire:
At the same time, President Volodymyr Zelensky is worried—as are many of his allies—that Western leaders and voters may grow impatient with the war if Ukraine doesn’t make much headway soon. This is especially true in the U.S., Ukraine’s main supplier, where many in Congress, as well as some leading Republican candidates in the 2024 presidential election, have expressed reluctance to keep sending Ukraine billions of dollars in military and economic aid. [my emphasis]
Ukrainian war goals, Mychajlo Podoljak version
Podoljak says, “We must make it clear to the world that this war cannot be ended with a compromise.” Of course it can. But this is understandable enough as a public position for Ukraine.
Still, speaking for a country locked in a war of attrition with a much more powerful foe, Podoljak expresses notably expansive ambitions:
For us, victory means not only the restoration of the 1991 borders. If Russia stays with today's political elite, Russia will always seek revenge. The ruling elites of Russia must fall. I mean the elites around Vladimir Putin. Russia is betting everything: Russia will either win or lose. If Russia wins, there will be no more international law. Then we will see other terrorist attacks and invasions all over the world. If Russia loses, then Russia will be preoccupied with its own internal problems, and the security of the European continent can be rebuilt. …
The offensive is advancing along the entire front line. We must destroy this army. Not only their armed forces in Ukraine, but also the entire armaments complex in Russia and Russia's military infrastructure. That takes time. [my emphasis]
This is nuts. NATO is not going to cheerfully start World War Three over Ukraine. NATO leaders, including Biden and Scholz and Macron, should tell Zelenskyy to have his spokespeople cut out the Dr. Strangelove talk.
Podaljak also includes this rather cryptic comment, “The more countries understand the nature of this war, the finale of this war, and the importance of upholding international law, the sooner this war will be over. And there will be no escalation either.“ (my emphasis) If he is meaning to say that other countries should complete ignore the possibility of nuclear escalation, that’s even more off-the-wall.
Meanwhile, there are implied threats to NATO from the Russian side. Poland is fretting about Wagner mercenary forces on its border with Belarus.4 Al Jazeera English reports5:
This kind of maneuvering between adversarial countries goes on all the time. But countries also miscalculate risks. So having the belligerent government that NATO is massively supporting declaring that the only acceptable military goal in the current war is the overthrow of the Russian government and the complete destruction of its army and armaments industry is, uh, not very helpful.
Meanwhile, the US officially has a higher strategic priority than going all Napoleon on Russia - the confrontation with China. War could break out any day over, say, a rusty Philippine shipwreck.6
Schocher, Stefan )2023): Ukrainischer Präsidentenberater Podoljak: "Die Eliten um Putin müssen fallen". Der Standard 10.08.2023. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000182391/die-eliten-um-putin-m252ssen-fallen> (Accessed: 2023-10-08). All translations from the German are mine.
Military Size by Country 2023. World Population Review. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-size-by-country> (Accessed: 2023-09-08).
Kaplan, Fred (2023): Ukraine’s New Strategy Against Russia. Slate 07/27/2023. <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2023/07/ukraine-russia-war-news-counteroffensive.html> (Accessed: 2023-09-2023).
Askew, Joshua (2023): Poland plans to deploy 10,000 troops on Belarus border as 'deterrent'. Euronews 08/10/2023. <https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/10/poland-plans-to-deploy-10000-troops-on-belarus-border-as-deterrent> (Accessed: 2023-10-08).
Poland to send up to 10,000 soldiers to border with Belarus. Al Jazeera English YouTube channel 08/10/2023. (Accessed: 2023-10-08).
The Poland-Belarus border is becoming a tinderbox. Responsible Statecraft 08/09/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/09/the-poland-belarus-border-is-becoming-a-tinderbox/> (Accessed: 2023-11-08).
Ratcliffe, Rebecca and Davidson, Helen (2023): US and China spar over Philippine shipwreck-turned-military outpost. The Guardian 08/09/2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/09/us-beijing-shipwreck-military-outpost-south-china-sea-philippines> (Accessed: 2023-10-08).