Ukrainian grain exports causing controversy in the EU
This isn’t good or bad in itself and presumably has no effect of the current Ukrainian war effort:
Slovakia has joined Poland and Hungary by unilaterally halting imports of grain and other food products from Ukraine to protect its farmers in decisions Kyiv and the European Commission have criticised as unacceptable.
The EU would expect the central European states “to come up with some explanation”, a senior official said, after Poland and Hungary announced their bans over the weekend and Slovakia followed suit on Monday. Bulgaria has also said it is considering a ban.
The official said low global prices and demand meant large quantities of Ukrainian grain in particular were staying in the bloc rather than being sold on, adding: “There is an issue … we’ll see what we can do in the coming weeks and months.”1 [my emphasis]
Aljazeera reports2:
But it is part of the larger picture of the potential relationships between Ukraine and the EU in the coming years. Agricultural subsidies are a touchy issue within the EU itself. And the current EU accession process would also require considerable restructuring of Ukrainian agriculture along neoliberal EU guidelines.
The arrangement of EU agricultural subsidies, which are largely paid as direct payments per hectare, determines budget returns. In Ukraine, in addition to small private farms, there are also large state-owned enterprises and, especially, agricultural holding companies with farms significantly larger than 1,000 ha in size. A transfer of the current type of direct payments would lead to large individual and total transfers to Ukraine. However, administrative structures based on the EU model would first have to be established for the processing and payment of these subsidies.
Past enlargements not only show conflicts but also offer possible solutions: Before the 2004 eastward enlargement, the old EU member states worried about their agricultural budget inflows. Conversely, large accession candidates such as Poland fought for high levels of agricultural support. After a Franco-German agreement, the future agricultural budget was capped and new members had to undergo a 10-year phasing-in process until they could match the same level of agricultural payments. For Ukraine, a longer phasing-in period is also conceivable. The deciding factor will be whether it can maintain its competitiveness despite the war, or whether it will have to rely on special agricultural reconstruction aid. Another prerequisite for accession is the completion of the land market reform initiated before the war to ensure transparency and procedural justice in land purchases and ownership. This would curb corruption and also protect smaller units from large-scale land acquisitions. At the same time, however, economies of scale of large farms should not be prevented altogether.3 [my emphasis]
After Russia, Ukraine is the largest country in Europe. Its agricultural production is enormous, giving it the nickname of “breakbasket of Europe,” or even of the world.
Reuters reports:
Before the war [i.e., before 2022], Ukraine was the world's fourth-largest corn exporter and fifth-biggest wheat seller, and a key supplier to poor countries in Africa and the Middle East that depend on grain imports. …
The war damage could cut Ukraine's potential grain harvest by 10 to 20 million tonnes a year, or up to a third based on its pre-war output of 60 to 89 million tonnes, the Soil Institute's director, Sviatoslav Baliuk told Reuters.4 [my emphasis]
A big reason for the gloomy future predictions is the poisoning of the soil by the war itself:
Scientists looking at soil samples taken from the recaptured Kharkiv region in northeastern Ukraine found that high concentrations of toxins such as mercury and arsenic from munitions and fuel are polluting the ground.
Using the samples and satellite imagery, scientists at Ukraine's Institute for Soil Science and Agrochemistry Research estimated that the war has degraded at least 10.5 million hectares of agricultural land across Ukraine so far, according to the research shared with Reuters.
That's a quarter of the agricultural land, including territory still occupied by Russian forces, in a country described as the breadbasket of Europe. [my emphasis]
If countries like Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are trying to buck EU regulations on grain imports from Ukraine now - and Poland is very much on Ukraine's side in the war (Hungary not so much) - imagine the kinds of discussion over agriculture alone within the EU if they take on the main burden of reconstructing not just Ukraine's agriculture but the rest of its economy, as well.
This is yet another reminder of a couple of basic facts of the current situation. One is that no matter when the war ends, Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO is likely to be as much as two decades away. The other is, the longer the war goes on, the more badly damaged Ukraine’s economic and civilian infrastructure will be.
Henley, Jon (2023): Slovakia joins Poland and Hungary in halting Ukraine grain imports. The Guardian 04/17/2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/slovakia-joins-poland-hungary-halting-ukraine-grain-imports> (Accessed: 2023-17-04).
Ukraine grain exports: Slovakia joins Poland and Hungary in import ban. Al Jazeera YouTube channel 04/17/2023. (Accessed: 2023-17-04).
Rudloff, Bettina (2022): Agriculture: Customary long-term accession model possible after improvement of competitive structure. In: Von Ondarza, Nicolai (coordinator), Ukraine’s possible EU accession and its consequences. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 22-July-2022. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/ukraines-possible-eu-accession-and-its-consequences> (Accessed 2023-17-04).
Nickel, Rod (2023): Soils of war: The toxic legacy for Ukraine's breadbasket. Reuters 03/01/2023. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/soils-war-toxic-legacy-ukraines-breadbasket-2023-03-01/> (Accessed 2023-17-04).