What are the Netanyahu government's war aims in Gaza?
And how much of the current Israeli policy should the US support?
Dan Drezner has an analysis of the current state of US policy toward Israel that tries to discern what the Netanyahu government’s actual approach really seeks to achieve:
I am coming to the conclusion Israel has a purpose in Gaza that goes beyond the elimination of Hamas. The Israeli government and the Israeli Defense Forces really want to restore their deterrent capabilities against any Palestinians or Arabs contemplating the elimination of the Jewish state. The problem is that the attack of October 7th caused such an erosion of that deterrent that it has led Israel to make some dangerous strategic choices.1
Hamas attacked Israel on October 7 with a brutal assault on Israeli civilians. What the Hamas leadership expected Israel’s response to be, we don’t know. But they must have expected Netanyahu’s government to initiate military operations that would kill many civilians as well as targeting active Hamas militants. And Israel is doing just that, so far having killed thousands of civilians.
Netanyahu has articulated no clear end goal other than destroying Hamas and no new approach to establish a lasting peace. He’s never had one, and he doesn’t have one now. It’s pretty obvious from the operations taking place that killing lots of civilian noncombatants is as much a part of his goals as destroying Hamas.
And we have to keep in mind that Netanyahu himself - with the approval of the US - has promoted the Islamic-terrorist group Hamas as a way to divide Palestinians away from the Palestine Liberation Organization that heads the West Bank administration and prevent a two-state solution.2
Craig Mokhiber, who recently resigned from the staff of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, argues that the two-state solution looks extremely difficult if not impossible3:
Drezner observes:
If it’s not entirely clear what the elimination of Hamas looks like, it’s only slightly more clear what deterring Hamas looks like now. That is because the abhorrent October 7th attacks succeeded way beyond anyone’s expectations — so much so that the IDF’s reputation for competence has been badly eroded. [He adds in a footnote, “As noted elsewhere, some of the blame for this falls squarely on Netanyahu. But the attack was devastating enough for there to be plenty of blame to spread around the whole of Israeli government.”]
This leads to an important question: how can a state and a military with an eroding reputation for deterrent capabilities restore that reputation? In the specific case of Israel, there’s the added challenge of trying to eliminate Hamas on its home turf when that entity has no doubt anticipated an IDF incursion. I don’t know a ton about warfighting but I do know that urban warfare is real, real bad. A long, drawn-out urban campaign might succeed in eliminating Hamas. Or it might be a reprise of past Israeli incursions into Lebanon, all of which ended badly for Israel. …
I think I can see what Israel is trying to do in Gaza. Given how much everyone in the region dislikes Hamas, it might not lead to as much blowback as observers fear. But it is hard to believe it will actually work. [my emphasis]
And he makes this grim observation:
Now, a significant amount of the blame for this lies with Hamas. The group purposefully caches its weapons and fighters in the civilian population in order to make it impossible for Israel to target them without causing massive collateral damage — which would be a violation of the laws of armed combat due to the lack of proportionality. That said, the whole point of these laws of war is that a civilized country adheres to them even if the other side does not.
In choosing to relax these norms, Israel might be hoping that it can cause Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and any Hamas successor group to adjust their expectations. If Israel demonstrates a willingness to be unconcerned with collateral damage, then these groups might conclude that previous survival tactics are no longer operable. In other words, it is possible that Israel believes it can restore its ability to deter by signaling its willingness to violate the laws and norms of warfighting.2
In other words, my concern is that for Israel, the indifference to civilian casualties is the point. [my emphasis]
The United States needs to use its considerable influence to restrain Netanyahu’s government from committing further war crimes. US foreign policy has enough problems without having to assume practical and moral complicity in criminal actions by a hardcore rightwing ethnonationalist like Bibi Netanyahu.
There is also the grim prospect that Israel may try to push all or a large part of the Palestinian population in Gaza into the Sinai desert.4
Haaretz columnist Aluf Benn argues that Israel’s policy to move large numbers of residents from northern Gaza has more purposes than protecting civilians:
Israel’s main strategic move in its war against Hamas is an expulsion, if only temporary, of the population of Gaza City to the south of the Gaza Strip, and the destruction of the city.
The briefings by the IDF Spokesperson, which focus on the tactical operations – the number of targets attacked, terrorists killed, and tunnels sealed – along with the prime minister’s speeches, chock-full of hollow slogans, obscure the larger picture of the war: Conquest of the northern Strip, while gradually clearing the area of Hamas forces. That’s what it's about.5 [my emphasis]
Of course, “destruction of the city” sounds an awful lot like another massive permanent relocation of Palestinians. Unless they expect all the residents to go back and live in the ruins.
With Gaza destroyed and overwhelmingly depopulated, Hamas will not be able to continue ruling the Strip like in the previous 16 years, and Israel won’t withdraw, let the residents return and allow the rebuilding of the city as long as Hamas is meant to receive the keys.
The photos – which will only become more gruesome with the concentrations of refugees in Khan Yunis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah, the rain and mud season and the danger of epidemics – are meant [by Netanyahu’s government] to pressure the international community and Arab countries to find someone other than [Hamas leader Yahya] Sinwar to take over Gaza. That’s the forecast for the coming winter. [my emphasis]
Gideon Levy wrote a few days after the October 7 attack by Hamas:
Gaza is plagued with Hamas, and Hamas is a despicable organization. But most residents of the Gaza Strip are not like that. Before we start flattening and destroying and uprooting and killing, we should take this into account. The reckoning must be with Hamas, not with all Gazans.6
But that’s not how the Netanyahu government is approaching it.
And the far right, heavily represented by Netanyahu and his extremist government, still dreams of a Greater Israel that incorporates Gaza into the current state of Israel:
Religious far-right ministers are not yet speaking of this openly but seven months ago, when the coalition passed the abolition of the Disengagement Law (largely a symbolic move) in the Knesset, National Missions Minister Orit Strock said in an interview that “there is no doubt that [the Gaza Strip] is part of the land of Israel and there will be a day when we return to it.”
The far right understands that talking about this now will cause public anger. However, in one of the expanded security cabinet meetings, extremist National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir stated: “We need to hold on to the territory.”
A lawmaker from the religious Zionist wing of the coalition recently used the term “ir ha’nidachat,” or the beguiled city – an Old Testament injunction to destroy a city where most of the inhabitants have began worshipping idols and who must therefore be killed and the city flattened: “And it shall be a heap for ever; it shall not be built again” (Deuteronomy 13:17). The lawmaker expressed the wish privately that this be done to at least some of the Gaza Strip.7 [my emphasis in bold]
Israel may already be basing its current policy on such reading of ancient books by grim fanatics. The United States is not obligated to support such a policy and should not.
Drezner, Daniel (2023): Here's The Thing About Israel's Grand Strategy. Drezner’s World (Substack) 11/09/2023. (Accessed: 2023-09-11).
Schneider, Tal (2023): For years, Netanyahu propped up Hamas. Now it’s blown up in our faces. Times of Israel 10/08/2023. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-yearsnetanyahu-propped-up-hamas-now-its-blown-up-in-our-faces/> (Accessed: 2023-20-10).
Ex-UN official: Palestine-Israel two-state solution 'a joke’ at UN. Aljazeera YouTube channel 11/09/2023. (Accessed: 2023-09-11).
Abraham, Yuval (2023): Expel all Palestinians from Gaza, recommends Israeli gov’t ministry. +972 Magazine 10/30/2023. <https://www.972mag.com/intelligence-ministry-gaza-population-transfer/> (Accessed: 2023-20-10).
Benn, Aluf (2023): Israel’s Tiebreaking War Move: Conquering Gaza City, Driving Residents South. Haaretz 11/09/2023. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-09/ty-article/.premium/israels-tiebreaking-move-in-gaza-driving-its-residents-south/0000018b-b05c-df42-a78f-bd5fe5e40000> (Accessed: 2023-09-11).
Levy, Gideon (2023): The Reckoning Must Be With Hamas, Not With All Gazans. Haaretz 09/12/2023. <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-10-12/ty-article-opinion/.premium/the-reckoning-must-be-with-hamas-not-with-all-gazans/0000018b-2020-d53b-af8b-737c1b7a0000> (Accessed: 2023-09-11).
Pfeffer, Anshel (2023): What Is Israel’s Endgame in Gaza? These Are the Three Key Dilemmas. Haaretz 10/30/2023. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-30/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-is-israels-endgame-in-gazathese-are-the-three-key-dilemmas/0000018b-8080-d4ba-a3ab-9a8d90aa0000> (Accessed: 2023-09-11).