Why the Dr. Strangelove approach to the Russia-Ukraine War is problematic
Why the Dr. Strangelove approach to the Russia-Ukraine War is problematic
And, sadly, that *does* need to be said
Simon Tisdall seems to be bouncing around a bit on the Russia-Ukraine War. To put it mildly. Here he is in late January sputtering about how the wimpy Germans need to man up and cheer louder for Ukraine:
Fears of an escalating, even nuclear conflict, most often expressed by Germany’s government, are daily trumped by the horror of Putin’s relentless butchery. Military escalation has become unavoidable, as shown by the ineluctable shift from providing light weapons last spring to advanced missile systems, state-of-the-art artillery, armoured fighting vehicles – and now, main battle tanks.
Every time a kindergarten, school or hospital is bombed; every time atrocious war crimes, rapes and hideous acts of torture are uncovered; every time a family weeps over the grave of a loved one, killed in a struggle waged on behalf of all, Europe’s obligation to resist such brutalism is reinforced.
In their hearts, Europeans know full well that defeat would be disastrous. Surveys show public opinion remains overwhelmingly hostile to Russia. While many people would back a negotiated settlement, they realise it’s unobtainable at present. Meanwhile, hesitant, unimaginative leaders such as Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, are pulled along by a tidal wave of disgust.1 [my emphasis]
Let’s see: If Western leaders happen to even think about the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons - the most nuclear weapons of any country in the world, actually - they are nothing but gutless Putin lackeys applauding all Russian war crimes. And if Russia isn’t crushed and ground into the dirt in Ukraine, the Rooskies will be running everything from Vladivostok to London within days!
Really? A Russian army that was effectively stopped and pushed back by the army of non-NATO-member Ukraine will be ready to sweep across Europe the moment Ukraine surrenders?
Is Tisdall competing for the much-coveted Tom Friedman Suck-On-This Award?2
Then here three months later, Tisdall recites statements from notorious hippie peaceniks including: 20-year-Council-on-Foreign-Relations-head Richard Haass; former director for European Affairs on the National Security Council Charles Kupchan; Über-Realist Stephen Walt; US Chair of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley; British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace; French President Emmanuel Macron; and even the same German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz he was calling a gutless wimp in January. And Tisdall seems to be saying that, gosh darn it, these shameless pacifists may have a point!
He argues that the following scenario is looking very possible, in which Russia is prepared to agree to stopping their push for addition territory and offer some kind of pause in place:
The US and its west European Nato allies declare that democratic Ukraine’s sovereign independence, and the global rules-based order, are saved. Poland and other east European states are less sure. Ukraine’s EU accession is dangled anew. Nato membership will be even trickier, as a Berlin-Brussels spat indicated last week. A final settlement “peace process” may take years. Renewed conflict will be a constant fear.
If this scenario, or something like it, transpires over the coming year, many Ukrainians will inevitably feel betrayed. US President Joe Biden’s pledge to “do whatever it takes” to repel Russia will go unfulfilled. Putin will survive in power despite his many atrocious crimes.
Yet like it or not, this increasingly appears the most likely outcome. A durable truce’s wider appeal is obvious. It would stop the slaughter, head off Russia-Nato nuclear-armed escalation, mitigate global economic, energy and food crises, and bring a sort of peace. Many in Europe and the global south would vote for that right now.3 [my emphasis]
Dude, what happened to you?!? Have you been mainlining RT broadcasts for the last two months? Did Tucker Carlson offer you a deep discount on membership dues for a new Viktor Orbán International Fan Club? (Tucker needs a post-FOX News project now.)
Tisdall further:
It’s clear Ukraine’s leaders have but a few months in which to beat the Russians back, before so far largely tacit but growing international pressure to open negotiations – whether they want them or not – becomes overt and potentially irresistible. Presumably, Putin knows this. It affords him an added incentive not to give ground.
Out of patience, a group of former senior diplomats last week urged chronically over-cautious western governments to finally “go all in” and provide better tanks, longer-range missiles and fighter aircraft “to pave the way to Ukrainian victory”. As Haass urged, “it’s time for the west to stop deterring itself”. But it may be too late. Too many politicians have dithered for too long. …
To end their pain and suffering, Ukrainians may soon be asked to swallow a very bitter pill. [my emphasis]
He still likes that Haass comment he quotes there. But he seems to be resigned to the fact that Ukraine isn’t going to be achieving Total Victory in the next couple of weeks. But, but, Simon … you just told us in January that would be the End of the West!! Or something along that line.
Simon, dude - you’ve got to up your game if you really want to win that Friedman Prize!!
On a more sober note, Tisdall is illustrating a big problem with the Democracies-vs.-Autocracies framing that the Biden Administration is using for the New Cold War. Democracies-vs.-Autocracies is a stand-in for Good-vs.-Evil. Which leads to the kind of big rhetorical swings we see from Tisdall above: from Dr. Strangelove talk about creaming the Rooskies and not worrying about their wimpy nuclear weapons, to a reluctant recognition that in wars sometimes one or more of the involved parties has to settle for a least-bad outcome.
All while couching the latter in a stab-in-the-back package so that later the super-hawks can say what they always say in such situations: if we had only escalated faster, if we had only been more ruthless in our tactics, if we had only killed more of the Bad Guys and killed them quicker … could-a, should-a, would-a.
The recent article that Haass and Kupchan co-authored is worth noting. It includes the line about the West deterring itself. But the context in which they use it is one in which they picture Ukraine falling considerably short of a complete victory in the short range:
It is thus time for the West to stop deterring itself and start giving Ukraine the tanks, long-range missiles, and other weapons it needs to wrest back control of more of its territory in the coming months. …
Yet for all the good that greater Western military help would do, it is unlikely to change the fundamental reality that this war is headed for stalemate. It is of course possible that Ukraine’s coming offensive proves stunningly successful and allows the country to reclaim all occupied territory, including Crimea, resulting in a complete Russian defeat. But such an outcome is improbable. Even if the West steps up its military assistance, Ukraine is poised to fall well short of vanquishing Russian forces. It is running out of soldiers and ammunition, and its economy continues to deteriorate. Russian troops are dug in, and fresh recruits are heading to the front. [my emphasis]
It’s a war of attrition. And Russia does have the advantage in a protracted war of attrition.
Moreover, if Moscow’s military position were to become precarious, it is quite possible that China would provide arms to Russia, whether directly or through third countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made a big, long-term wager on Putin and will not stand idly by as Russia suffers a decisive loss. Xi’s visit to Moscow in March strongly suggests that he is doubling down on his partnership with Putin, not backing away from it. Xi might also calculate that the risks of providing military assistance to Russia are modest. After all, his country is already decoupling from the West, and U.S. policy toward China seems destined to get tougher regardless of how much Beijing supports Moscow.4 [my emphasis]
Hawkish pundits and foreign policy mavens often operate in an environment in which, to use one of Paul Krugman’s favorite sayings, it’s better for their establishment reputation to be conventionally wrong than to be unconventionally right.
But reality has its own claims for attention, as well.
Steve Clemons has a couple of experts discuss the situation in more pragmatic terms, although it has some eye-rolling moments of its own5:
One of his guests, Matt Dimmick, who was a Russia specialist for the National Security Council, does make this comment just after 9:50 in the report: “Honestly, there’s really no excuse for the Administration not to be giving the Ukrainians everything they ask for an give it to them when they ask for it.”
This is silly talk. That is just not how this kind of thing works. Supporting a country in a war does not mean the US has to just agree to provide any kind of weaponry requested with no conditions and no evaluation of how the receiving country can and would use those weapons.
Pundits should really make an effort to keep their video-game fantasies in check when talking about real wars involving real people.
In Dimmick’s case, he talks here pretty bluntly about this war as a US proxy war against Russia, though his glib optimism is notable.
Clemons closes with some appropriately downbeat but realistic pessimism. “There is just no fairy-tale ending here.”
Tisdall, Simon (2023): Ukraine is fighting for all of us. Now Europe must fight Putin too. The Observer 01/22/2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jan/22/ukraine-is-fighting-for-all-of-us-now-europe-must-fight-putin-too> (Accessed: 2023-23-04).
That Time Thomas Friedman Told Iraq to "Suck on This". Majority Report YouTube channel 04/20/2014. (Accessed: 2023-23-04).
Tisdall, Simon (2023): Truce or a bloody stalemate? It all rides on Ukraine’s spring offensive. The Observer 04/23/2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/23/truce-stalemate-ukraine-spring-offensive-volodymyr-zelenskiy> (Accessed: 2023-23-04).
Haass, Richard & Kupchan, Charles (2023): The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine. Foreign Affairs website 04/13/2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations> (Accessed: 2023-24-04).
Clemons, Steve (2023): What do the leaked Pentagon papers tell us about the Ukraine war? The Bottom Line. Al Jazeera YouTube channel 04/20/2023. (Accessed: 2023-23-04).