Ukraine's least bad option?

Last Saturday I attended a panel at the Vienna Book Fair (Wien Buch Messe) on the Russia-Ukraine War featuring a leading Austrian political scientist, Anton Pelinka, moderated by Cathrin Kahlweit of the Süddeutsche Zeitung. The other two panelists were Ukrainian poet and translator Ganna Gendkova and Leigh Turner, who has served as Britain’s Ambassador to both Ukraine and Austria. (Journalist Armin Thurnher recently referred to Pelinka as “the doyen of Austrian political scientists”. ¹)

From the program’s description of the panel:

On February 24, 2022, Russian troops invaded Ukraine to overthrow the Kiev government. The project misfired. For the last almost two years, a bloody war has been raging in Eastern Europe. A war that brings immeasurable suffering to many people – and at the same time reshuffles the geostrategic cards. Putin's Russia, the aggressor, has become the pariah of Europe, and the West is standing by Ukraine's defenders with surprising unanimity. The pro-Kremlin trolls whom Putin unleashed, have been trying in vain to drive a wedge into the Western support front. But how much longer will the Ukrainian forces and their supporters hold out? And what is at stake for Europe and all of us in this war?²

The main book featured was a collection of Ukrainian articles and essays from 2013 to 2023 translated by Gnedkova, Ukraine mon amour. Stimmen einer freien Nation (2023). The idea of the book is to present a range of Ukrainian reflections to a German-speaking audience that goes back to 2014, when the Euromaidan protests were followed by Russian seizure of Crimea and portions of the Ukrainian oblasts (provinces) of Donetsk and Luhansk.

All three participants took a advocacy position on behalf of Ukraine, and largely reflected the Ukrainian government’s official rhetoric that if the NATO countries just gives Ukraine the weapons it needs, they can beat the Russians. This is a very familiar plea by now, e.g., “Experts: US ‘Owes It’ to Ukraine to Provide F-16s and Long-Range Missiles.”³

Even Pelinka somewhat surprisingly complained that if NATO had made Ukraine a full member, Russia would not have dared to invade them. Neither he nor the other panelists bothered to go into detail about the actual disputes with Russia over Ukraine in particular joining NATO. Nor did they discuss the fact that Ukraine did not meet the criteria for joining the alliance and still does not. And when we’re talking about conditions under which the nuclear-armed NATO alliance will commit itself to go to war with nuclear-armed Russia, the preparedness of new candidate countries is no trivial or arbitrary thing. The quality of their intelligence services is a key component that has to be very carefully evaluated.

And since 2014, Russia has been in effective control of significant parts of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Admitting Ukraine to NATO under those conditions would have been and still would be effectively a declaration of war by NATO against Russia. Certainly, one could argue that, well, heck, we should have just gone to war with Russia in 2014 anyway! But for anyone not indulging in neocon foreign-policy hashish, that would seem to be a frivolous position to take.

Looking forward to 2099

So it was also surprising near the end of the discussion when Pelinka said, to the evident dismay of his fellow panelists, that for Ukraine the “least bad” immediate outcome would be a ceasefire that would freeze the current territorial control between Ukraine and Russia. He referred to Kashmir as his model of how that would work. Kashmir “has been the subject of dispute between India and Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947.”⁴

By that standard, Ukraine and Russia will still be negotiating over the occupied territory until at least 2099. But Pelinka is scarcely alone in seeing the prospects for a near-term military victory that would regain most or all the territory currently controlled by Russia as unlikely in the extreme. It’s a war of attrition in which Russia has a substantial advantage.

The Austrian news weekly Profil recently illustrated the current situation in Ukraine with this graphic⁵:

Red shows the Russia-annexed Crimea; lighter-red the “separatist” Russian-controlled so-called independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk; light rust-color the remaining currently Russian-controlled areas; and, the small blue area shows the territory recaptured by Ukraine in its recent counteroffensive.

As Profil reports:

For [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it is becoming increasingly difficult to convince his allies that victory against Russia is still possible. Twenty months after the start of the war [in February 2022], Russia controls around a fifth of Ukraine's territory. Tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians have died - and the world's interest in the suffering of the Ukrainians is waning.

In June, Ukraine launched a large-scale counteroffensive, but there were no resounding successes. The aim of the military operation was to break through Russian positions, advance to the Sea of Azov and cut off supplies to enemy troops in order to force Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. But they are a long way from that. Although some partial successes were achieved, such as the conquest of small villages, in the end it was a battle over meters.

Gerasimov, Nikita (2023): Der Krieg hat sich eingegraben. Der Freitag 02.11.2023, 8.

The recent history of magic weapons for Ukraine

And there are no magic weapons that would suddenly and substantially change that situation. The US could give them nuclear weapons. And there are surely many Ukrainian officials who now regret that their country agreed to give up their nukes in 1994.⁶ (Incorrigible “realist” foreign policy analysts including Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer advised Ukraine against doing so at the time.)

But anyone who thinks giving Ukraine nuclear weapons at this juncture would be a good idea should really, really cut down their consumption of the neocon hashish.

There has been a continuing drama since the war began of Ukraine asking for certain kinds of weapons, the US and NATO holding back on some of them, then eventually delivering them, where they don’t produce magical breakthroughs. Then: rinse and repeat.

Nikita Gerasimov gives a recent round during the big 2023 Ukrainian offensive as an example:

The symbolic end of the offensive was represented by the ATACMS ballistic missiles from US stockpiles. For months, the supply of these systems had been controversial and caused heated debates. Proponents argued that the missiles were a "game changer" and would cause Russian lines to collapse. Opponents of this transfer feared an uncontrollable escalation if ATACMS were used against Russian territory.

The media attention became so great that the White House, after a long delay, decided to provide Kiev with a very limited number of missiles, which was admitted only after the fact. The reason given was that this was to protect the transport [of the ATACMS] from possible Russian attacks and to achieve a surprise effect during the first deployment. When Ukrainian troops fired the missiles in mid-October, the assessment remained ambiguous. Whether it was a game changer or a reason for escalation – in the end, none of this happened. Rather, the ATACMS quickly became part of the routine of war, like the HIMARS, Storm Shadows or SCALP cruise missiles, which were also praised as game changers.⁷ [my emphasis]

A ceasefire is a choice that Russia and Ukraine have to make. Or not.

We can look at the arguments for a ceasefire agreement based on the current situation. But for a ceasefire or extended peace agreement to happen, both Russia and Ukraine have to decide it’s in their interest. There are objective factors shaping the situation. But there are subjective factors at work, too. Ted Snider reported earlier this month:

[Ukrainian President] Zelensky is facing pressure both from within Ukraine and from without. Growing pressure from within is coming from both the political and military leadership; growing pressure from without is coming from Ukraine’s key partners.

The battle is largely being played out in the Western media. Most intimately, Zelensky has faced criticism from his political inner circle. TIME magazine reports that some of the president’s advisors have become worried that his “belief in Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia . . . “verg[es] on the messianic.” One of Zelensky’s “closest aides” said that Zelensky “deludes himself.” The aide complained, “We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.”

Some Zelensky aides say his intransigence hampers Ukraine’s ability to adapt to the changed reality on the battlefield and worry that negotiating a settlement with Russia remains “taboo.”⁸ [my emphasis]

Zelenskyy has to not only evaluate the military situation but also to be concerned about the political reaction at home in a more direct way than Putin has to consider in Russia. There are big subjective factors involved. And short of outright physical defeat of one side or the other, those play a major role.

Ukraine has been badly damaged by the war in terms of lost lives, millions of refugees fleeing the country, damage to their economy, and massive placement of landmines. If the war could be ended for an extended period of time, i.e., years, that could give Ukraine time to recover, to build up their military capabilities, and a chance to take advantage of new international developments or a more flexible government in Russia. But looking at not only the Kashmir situation but other cases of long-divided countries including China-Taiwan-Hong Kong, North and South Korea, and East and West Germany from 1945-1990, the such a peace agreement that could mean decades of national division for Ukraine. Something most Ukrainian leaders are likely to regard as a fate to be avoided if at all reasonably possible.

For Ukraine’s most important ally, the US, continued fighting does have the effect of weakening Russia, which in geopolitical terms is its biggest stake in the situation. But public support for continued US aid is waning. And the main official strategic priority for US foreign policy is China. The war in Ukraine is a distraction from that. And also from the situation in the Middle East that has deteriorated so quickly and drastically since October 7. And the Israel-Palestine situation is not only a higher immediate priority for the US than Ukraine, it’s also a major distraction from the ongoing reorientation of US policy to containing China (official US policy since the Obama Administration).

Russia initiated the war in Ukraine for reasons including strategic concerns about the expansion of NATO. But the war is costly. It even produced the bizarre coup attempt (or pantomine of a coup attempt?) by the since-deceased Yevgeny Prigozhin⁹, so it hasn’t been an unqualified success for Vladimir Putin and his government. But since Prigozhin was using the difficulties Russia has encountered in Ukraine as a justification to move against Putin’s government, that’s an indication that Putin may see advantages in freezing the conflict indefinitely and declaring that a victory. And it would be a victory insofar as Ukraine is effectively blocked from joining NATO or even the EU as long as Russia controls a significant amount of Ukrainian territory. Diplomats can be very creative. But both NATO and the EU treaties have mutual-defense commitments, so accepting a partlially-occupied Ukraine into either would effectively mean a declaration of war against Russia.

So at the moment, Ukraine is stuck in a war of attrition in which it is at a serious disadvantage.

1. Thurnher, Armin (2023): Die SPÖ inm Zeitalter des Bablerismus. Falter 46:2023, 13. My translation from German.

2. Entscheidet der Krieg in der Ukraine über das weitere Schicksal Europas? Wien Buch Messe 2023. <https://www.buchwien.at/programm/bloodlands-entscheidet-der-krieg-in-der-ukraine-ueber-das-weitere-schicksal-europas/> (Accessed: 2023-15-11). My translation from German. Image from the Book Fair’s Messe-Guide 2023.

3. Harpley, Unshin Lee (2023): Experts: US ‘Owes It’ to Ukraine to Provide F-16s and Long-Range Missiles. Air & Space Forces Magazine 09/26/2023. <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/experts-us-ukraine-f-16s-long-range-missiles/> (Accessed: 2023-13-11).

4. Editors (2023): Kashmir. Britannica Online 11/08/2023. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent> (Accessed: 2023-15-11).

5. Geets, Sibohán (2023): Winter über Kiew. Profil 12.11.2023, 40-42.

6. Letter dated 7 December 1994... UN Security Council. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_1994_1399.pdf> (Accessed: 2023-15-11).

7. Gerasimov, Nikita (2023): Der Krieg hat sich eingegraben. Der Freitag 02.11.2023, 8. My translation from German.

8. Snider, Ted (2023): Is this the beginning of the end of the war in Ukraine? Responsible Statecraft 11/08/2023. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-talks-russians/> (Accessed: 17-11-2023).

9. Sauer, Pjotr (2023): Yevgeny Prigozhin: A death that will leave a lasting mark on Russian army and elite. The Guardian 08/23/2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/23/prigozhins-death-would-leave-lasting-mark-on-russian-army-and-elite> (Accessed: 17-11-2023).